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The purpose of this thesis is to elaborate on the prelude and postlude of widespread protests 
across the Middle East and North Africa in 2010 and subsequent years. These series of events 
became known as the Arab Spring. The thesis will elaborate on economic conditions at the 
doorstep of the Arab Spring to assess potential economic motivations for protestors. 
Furthermore, we evaluate its aftermath, and whether conditions have improved. Both parts will 
focus on the same macroeconomic indicators. In addition, the thesis includes an assessment of 
institutional quality to supplement our understanding of the Arab Spring. 
When analyzing Arab economies along macroeconomics indicators, we apply the seven-step 
dynamic crisis model by Ola H. Grytten and Arngrim Hunnes, as well as drawing on elements 
from crisis theories by Hyman Minsky and Charles P. Kindleberger. 
In the first part of our analysis, we evaluate the development of eight selected macroeconomic 
indicators in four specific countries prior to the preliminary Tunisian protests in December 
2010. In the second part of our analysis, we evaluate the same indicators in the same countries 
for the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Upon doing so, we apply the Hodrick-Prescott-filter to 
separate cycles components from the trend and evaluate these cycles along the eight indicators 
prior to and after protests erupted. Cycle values for other Arab states are presented for 
comparison. The purpose is to evaluate whether things have changed for the better, the worse, 
or not at all in the region. The third part of our analysis elaborates the institutional quality of 
Arab countries. This is done to shed light on the Arab Spring from a societal perspective. 
In the fourth part of our analysis, we implement empirical findings from foregoing sections into 
the seven-step dynamic crisis model. The purpose of this is to direct attention towards important 
dynamics of economic crisis stemming from an exogenous shock. Furthermore, we seek to 
assess whether we find evidence for the occurrence of the seven elements stipulated in the 
model. 
Our analysis shows that macroeconomic cycles alone cannot be blamed for the eruption of 
protests. We do, however, emphasize that economic circumstances were poor although business 
cycles in 2010 imply otherwise. Poor overall institutional quality is also likely a contributor to 
grievance and unrest. Furthermore, our findings indicate a worsening of conditions along 
several macroeconomic indicators since 2010. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, we find 
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On December 10th, 2017, 26-year-old fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in 
front of his local town hall. This act of desperation was a manifestation of the grievances widely 
acknowledged and felt by his fellow citizens in Tunisia. Shortly thereafter, dismay and 
demonstrations arose all over the country, and before a month had passed Arabs were voicing 
their discontent across the Middle East. Acting upon principles of Human Rights, basic liberties, 
and economic grievances, the populations rose in a manner not previously seen in the young 
Arab states, most of which were established in the wake of the Second World War. Although 
there is little doubt that economic circumstances played a part in the rising tensions, it remains 
dubious to what extent it made the uprising inevitable. Many Arab countries were not unfamiliar 
with oppression, low wages, and high levels of unemployment. 
 
Although the global financial crisis did seemingly not create a sizable dent in the real economies 
of Arab states initially (ILO, 2009), many feared the lagging consequences in the time to 
come. Importantly, the capacity to react to economic shocks varied, and still varies, vastly 
between countries. GCC-countries were able to utilize large financial resources to cushion the 
immediate blow, whereas others were less successful as such (Saif & Choucair, 2009). Notably, 
recommendations for the Arab countries prior to the Arab Spring encompassed among other 
factors improvements to socioeconomic conditions, gender equality and social dialogue 
between citizens and authorities (ILO, 2009). Thus, stroking upon central grievances among 
citizens. Arab economies were not able to respond and recover before they were struck by yet 
another exogenous shock i.e., the Arab Spring. 
 
The purpose of this paper is twofold, firstly, to evaluate the extent to which economic 
circumstances were responsible for the demonstrations and insurgencies known as the Arab 
Spring that followed the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi.  Secondly, to elaborate on 
the entailing financial and real economic consequences. Conveniently, relevant data has been 
collected over almost a decade as the Arab Spring marked its 10-year anniversary at the end of    
2020 and early 2011. To our knowledge there are few papers that bridge the post financial crisis 
landscape with the eruption and consequences of the Arab Spring. Numerous publications 
address specific aspects of the uprisings. However, our ambition is to elaborate the prelude and 
postlude based on the seven-step dynamic crisis model, and supplement with an institutional 
assessment. Evidently, the purpose is to encapsulate both topics in 
a twofold economic approach to the Arab Spring. 
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1.1 Research question   
This paper encompasses an economic approach to the popular revolts known as the Arab Spring 
starting in 2010 and 2011 in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The purpose of 
this thesis is to shed more light on macroeconomic factors that may have played a part in the 
foregoing and subsequent economic landscape in the region. In that context, particular 
emphasis will be placed on a specified selection of factors. The research question is: 
 
Economic causes and consequences of the Arab Spring 
 
Evidently, the research question reaches wide and far. The paper will assess economic 
conditions which led to the eruption of the Arab Uprising in 2010 and 2011, as well as 
evaluating its aftermath.  Limitations and specifications are elaborated in the following to 
narrow down the scope of the paper. 
 
1.2 Demarcation 
The following is an economic crisis analysis, and the focus area is indicated in the research 
question. When mapping the macroeconomic terrain for the MENA-region, both prior and after 
the Arab Spring revolts, we will be evaluating dynamics across a section of central 
indicators. Data on the dynamics of these indicators is extracted using World Bank-, IMF-, and 
FRED Economic Research databases. 
 
The paper will approach the Arab Spring twofold by firstly evaluating circumstances prior to 
the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi and secondly assessing developments in the time 
that followed up until today. As such, it becomes relevant to consider the potential impact of 
the international financial crisis after 2007-2008 on the region. Notably, the primary emphasis 
will be placed on the effect of the 2010-2011 events, but with a glance at conditions before to 
the Arab Spring. 
 
In addition to catering to macroeconomic factors, the analysis will contain an integrated 
institutional development index intended to underscore fundamental institutional components 
that, depending on their respective strengths, may serve to preempt or enhance the impact of a 
crisis. Furthermore, it may shed more light on elements connected to macroeconomic factors 
that are not directly expressed in variables such as GDP and unemployment, but nonetheless are 




The paper also contains a geographical demarcation by which particular attention is directed at 
a handful of countries. The MENA-region as a whole and the GCC-countries will be analyzed 
separately. These two subdivisions provide points of reference when assessing dynamics in 
specific Arab countries. The selected countries are Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon 
respectively. Although all four countries experienced turmoil as a result of the Arab Spring, it 
did not turn into armed conflict. Consequently, accessibility of data is better relative to countries 
such as Libya, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Another common denominator is the absence 
of valuable petroleum resources which places them on a different economic specter compared 
to GCC-countries. 
2.0 Theory 
This chapter presents three theories that explain the structure and development of economic 
crises. The paper's theoretical basis is constituted by Grytten and Hunnes, Minsky, and 
Kindleberger. This lays the foundation for Chapter 9 - "The seven-step dynamic crisis model 
and evidence from the Arab Spring". 
2.1 Minsky´s crisis-model  
In the 1970´s, macroeconomist Hyman P. Minsky (1919–1996) developed a descriptive crisis 
model to explain how crises usually occur. His dynamic model describes the development from 
an economy in equilibrium to an economy that loses financial stability (Grytten & Hunnes, 
2016, p.38). The model is based on changes in monetary conditions and is more theoretical than 
empirical. It has a built-in deterministic pessimism, which means that phases are determined by 
previous events which make a crisis inevitable. Furthermore, Minsky's model emphasizes 
weaknesses in the monetary system, instability in the credit system, debt structure, speculation, 
and leverage cycles. 
Financial instability  
Financial stability means that the financial system is able to facilitate financing, resist 
disruptions, make payments, and redistribute risk effectively (Norges Bank, 2020). Loss of 
financial stability means that the market is in an unsustainable equilibrium, i.e., loss of the 
ability to withstand financial shocks in the economy. Financial instability in financial markets 
can trigger cyclical fluctuations of various sizes. Minsky thought that financial instability could 
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be the main reason for crises. The size and severity of fluctuations determine whether one ends 
up in a crisis or not (Minsky, 1982).   
Minsky´s model in five phases 
Displacement  
The main element in this phase is an exogenous macroeconomic shock that initiates a series of 
events that can eventually end in a crisis. Macroeconomic shocks can be, for example, economic 
liberalization, innovations, natural disasters, changes in monetary policy, or war. These changes 
can affect either the prospects, expectations, profit opportunities, or traders’ behavior in the 
market. Displacement leads to financial instability because the economy disconnects from its 
natural growth path.  
Overtrading  
In the second phase, the changes from the macroeconomic shock are assumed to persist, and 
higher demand pushes up prices. Traders become irrational and overestimate profit 
opportunities, and even the "common man" begins to speculate. Financial speculation occurs, 
and due to herd mentality, assets are gradually priced above their fundamental value.  
The positive demand shock raises expectations of increased profitability. Due to the demand 
shock, companies produce and invest more, and revenues increase. The economy is in in 
exponential growth phase where investors start to take higher risks, households take out large 
loans to participate in the upswing, and banks ease lending requirements while granting riskier 
loans. Overoptimism cause people to act less rationally. 
Monetary-expansion 
The economy enters the third phase, where the shock induces increased demand for money and 
credit, and monetary and credit policies tend to be more expansionary. The instruments in 
expansionary monetary policy are to increase the money supply or lower interest rates. 
Increased money supply again leads to increased demand. The economic policy amplifies the 
economic cycle. When companies or households see others make money on speculative 
purchases, they want to follow suit. Money and optimism cause asset bubbles to arise. Prices 
of securities gradually increase due to speculation, and many find it reasonable to take part in 
the price increase. This brings the markets toward asset bubbles and an overheated economy 




The fourth phase contains a turning point. Large fluctuations in asset prices characterize this 
period due to increased uncertainty in the market. Traders begin to understand that the markets 
are overheated and that asset prices lack real economic coverage. The economic upswing has 
not come from real economic growth but from monetary expansion. As long as more 
speculators want to enter the market, this does not cause a crucial problem. The problem arises, 
however, when no one wants in, but everyone wants out. When all the speculators want to sell 
out simultaneously, a positive shift in the supply curve occurs. The result is that prices plummet. 
Due to the price slump, there is panic in the market. Growth in money and credit slows down, 
and the economy enters an economic downturn. The banks tighten lending activities, and it 
becomes difficult for companies to take out new loans to repay losses on already loan financed 
assets.  
The moment markets turn is referred to as the "Minsky moment". According to Minsky, there 
are three classic signs that a crisis is on its way: A company or a bank goes bankrupt, fraud is 
detected by an investor who wants to withdraw the market, or a rapid fall in the price of a 
security or commodity occurs (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005).  
Discredit 
Demand, wealth and optimism are reversed, and the economy enters a negative spiral with 
gloomy prospects. The rationale for investors is to sell before prices fall further. They flock to 
safe harbors, often in the form of government bonds or a safe currency. Bank liquidity weakens, 
bankruptcies increase, and liquidity problems arise due to lack of capital. 
2.2 Kindleberger´s crisis theory  
Charles P. Kindleberger (1910–2003) was an economic historian from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology and an enthusiast of neoclassicism. Based on previous crisis theory and 
Minsky´s crisis model, Kindleberger formed his own dynamic theory of crises. Compared to 
Minsky's model, the phases are less distinct, and he adds that the role of hegemonic power is 
crucial to the outcome of each phase. His theory is therefore less deterministic. Even if the first 
phase occurs, it does not have to result in an economic crisis. A strong hegemonic power can 




A hegemonic power is a major player with influence in the market. At the national level, it can 
be the central bank, whereas internationally it can be the EU or the IMF. Kindleberger places 
great emphasis on the influence of hegemonic power on crises. The power of hegemony can 
decide whether there will be a crisis, and how long it will last. The absence of a hegemonic 
power creates, prolongs, and deepens crisis. 
Hegemonic power shall ensure countercyclical credit in the market, coordinate macroeconomic 
policy, provide a stable foreign exchange market, and act as a lender of last resort (Kindleberger 
C. P., 1986). Furthermore, hegemonic power must be able to help the market by maintaining 
demand in an economic downturn. At the same time, it is essential to slow down demand in an 
upswing so that there are no bubbles in the market. 
The course of the crisis 
Compared to Minsky, Kindleberger places less emphasis on distinct phases on the road to crisis. 
However, he remarks that a crisis can be explained through three phases i.e., mania, panic, and 
crisis.  
Mania 
Kindleberger and Aliber describe mania as a loss of rational thinking. Economic theory is built 
on the fact that people and investors respond rationally to changes in economic conditions. 
Expectations of a secure financial future and increasing profits lead investors to buy more risky 
assets. The banks grant riskier loans due to increased optimism (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005). 
Furthermore, mania is characterized by an aggregate loss of rationality. This is because 
expectations of future profitability improve. Kindleberger highlights factors such as 
undervalued risk premiums, low real interest rates, and misjudgment of the market which lead 
to mania and speculation (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005). 
Panic 
As market prices for stocks and real estate rise, investors realize that prices are too high. Thus, 
they are afraid of losing money and want to sell out quickly. When many want to sell and few 
want to buy, prices plummet. This phase is characterized by uncertain investors who wish to 
sell out to secure profits while banks realize that the risk of debt default is growing. 
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Kindleberger explains this as a change in the investor's mindset from optimism to pessimism. 
This change causes instability in the credit market as borrowers, both individuals and 
businesses, realize that their indebtment is too big compared to their income. Borrowers begin 
to adjust to the new financial expectation and reduce their consumption to pay debts or save 
more. Lenders realize that they have too many risky loans in their portfolio and want repayment 
of outstanding debt from the riskiest borrowers, and they tighten sharply on the lending criteria 
(Kindleberger & Aliber, 2005). 
Crashes 
Collapse is a fact, and the market values plummet. When the prices of assets and real estate fall, 
people lose money. Investors have borrowed money for speculation, leading to debt and 
bankruptcy defaults. Pessimism and fear paralyze credit markets (Kindleberger, & Aliber, 
2005) 
Kindleberger´s periodization  
Like Minsky, Kindleberger developed a theory of crisis building. Kindleberger does not have 
as clear phases as Minsky but uses a periodization to explain the three phases of mania, panic, 
and crashes. 
Monetary-expansion 
This phase corresponds to the first three phases of Minsky: displacement, overtrading, and 
monetary expansion. A macroeconomic shock changes people's expectations, expected profit 
opportunities, and behavior. 
Businesses and households join the investment wave, and a solid expansion in the money and 
credit market occurs. Increased money supply is enough to create a spiral of increasing 
optimism, demand, and credit that leads the economy away from its natural trajectory. 
Swindles  
In this phase, speculation is visible, and the market is in a position where it is clear that there 
will be overheating. Market participants sense the risk, but still trade because there are profits 
to be made. Investors partake in speculation and economic activities in a moral and legal gray 





This phase resembles Minsky's revulsion when market uncertainty begins to spread. 
Expectations of future earnings and price growth decline, and people realize that prices have 
previously been overestimated. The situation goes from a period where mania and optimism 
characterize the market to a situation where the market is characterized by pessimism and 
hesitance. As prices fall, more people are unable to pay their debt. Bank’s experience significant 
losses and tighten up lending terms. The credit market stops. The economy enters a negative 
spiral from which it is hard to get out.   
Domestic-propagation 
In this phase, the crisis spreads to other markets due to adverse ripple effects, whereby reduced 
profitability leads to reduced investment and consumption. A financial crisis can thus spread to 
the real economy, and vice versa. If a hegemonic power does not intervene successfully in the 
critical phase, it will spread to other domestic markets. Potentially this could lead to stock 
market falls and affect the housing market. 
International-propagation 
Economies are interconnected across national borders. International investments, trade, and 
cash flows mean that countries are mutually influenced by each other's economic state. For 
example, history shows that international stock markets develop side by side, a phenomenon 
particularly observed during financial crises. This can be explained by evaluating transmission 
mechanisms between international markets during financial crises.  
2.3 Seven-step dynamic crisis model 
Ola Honningdal Grytten and Arngrim Hunnes created a seven-step dynamic crisis model based 
on empirical data from historical crises and existing crisis theories. The model is inspired by 
Kindleberger, Minsky, and Eichengreen (Grytten & Hunnes, 2016, p.45). The seven phases 
illustrate a pattern that can lead to a financial crisis.  
 
  Figure 2.1 - Seven-step dynamic crisis model. Source Grytten 2020 (PP. Kriseteori 24.08.2020). 
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The steps are not inseparable and may often merge. The model can be applied to analyze various 
crises, although not all crises touch on all seven elements. The seven steps are elaborated in the 
following. 
Step.1:.Disruption 
Disruption can be defined based on Kindleberger's theory. He states that the path towards crisis 
begins in the form of exogenous shock. Examples of such shocks are changes to economic 
policy, discovery of valuable natural resources, innovations, immigration, and war. A common 
feature is that they lead to increased activity in the economy, which means that market stability 
is jeopardized. The increased economic activity is often accompanied by credit- and money 
growth, as well as inflation. 
The exogenous shock may be caused by factors on both the demand and supply sides. An 
example of the demand side is expansive monetary and fiscal policy leading to credit expansion. 
An example on the supply side is the discovery of natural resources, which may lead to large 
scale investments and subsequent monetary overflow. Innovations and war can have the same 
effect. It is common for warfare to be financed by banknote printing, entailing rapid growth in 
money and credit volumes. This abundance of money provides a surplus of demand that gives 
a boost to the economy. 
Step.2:.Overheating 
If investors expect the consequences of the macroeconomic shock to persist, they adapt 
accordingly by assuming that activity and profitability will increase. Minsky described this as 
euphoria, a condition where people have exaggerated expectations of future returns. The 
economy overheats as more people partake in speculation. Many want to invest in assets to later 
reap the benefits of price increase. Hence, the economy accelerates while credit demand 
increases. There is an increased demand for credit since economic activity accelerate. 
Step.3:.Bubble.economy 
In the third phase, it becomes clear that the economy is going too fast. Nonetheless, investors 
continue their activity because they make profit if the upswing continues. Since market prices 
of assets exceed the fundamental values, bubbles emerge. Monetary expansion and speculation, 
rather than real economic growth, drive the economy forward. After the real economy shows 
signs of decline, the abundance of money creates a kind of artificial financial growth. Although 
investors are aware that prices are artificially high, they continue to invest as they expect further 
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price increases. According to the Greater Fool-theory, it is individually rational to invest as long 
as somebody else comes along after you (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2011). 
Step.4:.Nervousness 
Eventually, the markets start to get nervous. Banks narrow their lending, and market 
participants become less willing to trade what they fear to be overpriced assets. When markets 
are nervous, they react strongly to new information, whether positive or negative. Prices 
therefore tend to fluctuate visibly. 
Kindleberger points out that in nervous markets, companies are more likely to engage in activity 
in the gray zone. For example, this could be attempting to hide their real financial position or 
operating results. Kindleberger calls this swindle. Furthermore, unsustainable investment 
projects can be commonplace. To avoid a downturn that could lead to an asset crash and 
financial crisis, the authorities are often inclined to grant loans or reduce lending rates. 
Step. 5:.Turning point 
Sooner or later, the negative expectations will prevail, culminating in the Minsky moment. As 
markets turn around, people will fear financial losses, and they want to sell out as quickly as 
possible. The problem is that few want to buy. Since there are ´few investors willing to buy, 
supply is much higher than demand. The result of the imbalance is that the market ends up in 
a vacuum condition where market prices fall sharply. This condition is often referred to as 
panic. Economic activity is stifled, and the volume of money and credit is significantly 
reduced. 
Step.6:.Crisis 
In this phase, pessimistic expectations dominate the market. Market participants are incurring 
losses on asset price falls, bankruptcy rates increase, and credit institutions are throttled.  
Distrust reduces credit institutions' willingness to lend so that the crisis spreads to the rest of 
the business community. When the liquidity flow is reduced, companies have problems 
maintaining the level of activity. The result being a reduction in aggregate demand. Disposable 
income among households and tax revenue are reduced due to the downsizing, which in turn 
further reduces aggregate demand. The economy is now in a negative spiral, and the 
government must intervene to turn the tide. Contractions often go much further than the 
fundamental condition would suggest. 
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Typically, investors who can invest will sit on the fence until they think the bottom has been 
reached and invest when there are prospects for profit. consequently, negative speculation takes 
place (Grytten & Hunnes, 2016, p.50) 
Step.7:.Spread 
Financial crises tend to spread to other markets, and may well spread across borders. How 
widespread the crisis is could be determined by the degree of market integration and 
government responses. For example, a stock market crash may only induce minor ripple effects 
on the real economy. However, if the effects of the crash are long lasting, it may lead to the 
credit sector incurring big losses and liquidity flows drying up. In such a scenario, the crash 
could spread to the real economy. Internationalization causes financial crises to spread more 
rapidly across national borders. 
3.0 Data and sources 
3.1 Introduction 
In this section we elaborate on the data material applied in the analysis. To construct strong 
observations and draw the correct conclusions, it is essential to have access to reliable sources. 
Initially, we will underscore the criteria. Thereafter, the relevant sources for this paper will be 
assessed. 
3.2 Validity and reliability 
Validity 
The validity of a data set is assessed according to the extent to which the material measures the 
phenomenon in question. That is, how relevant the data is for the topic of research. Evidently, 
one must derive precise information to answer the research question to achieve high validity. It 
is possible to have high reliability and low validity by applying highly trustworthy data sources 
to measure a less relevant phenomenon (Golafshani, 2003). An example of the latter would be 
applying reliable data for nominal GDP to measure economic activity, when in reality the more 
precise indicator would be inflation-adjusted real GDP. 
Reliability 
The reliability of a data source refers to the dependability and precision of the relevant 
information presented. Essentially, it is a matter of data precision relative to real conditions. 
Reliability can be affected by the method of gathering information, how it is processed, and 
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how it is presented. High reliability is thus diminished by accurately presented data, harvested 
consistently over time, and whether the data has been applied before (Golafshani, 2003). 
3.3 Assessment of validity and reliability 
Macroeconomic key figures - sources 
Upon evaluating quantifiable macroeconomic indicators, the primary data foundation is 
constituted by the World Bank, the OECD, the International Monetary Fund, and Organization 
of Islamic Cooperation. Notably, datasets extracted from World Bank databases occasionally 
contain estimates for Arab countries. This is the case for unemployment rates. These are 
constituted by modeled ILO-estimates. 
Data on the remaining macroeconomic indicators is provided by the World Bank and the IMF. 
However, although these are highly acknowledged and trusted organizations, it is relevant to 
problematize the extent to which information sharing in the respective countries is conducted 
transparently. There have been examples, such as in Tunisia prior to the Arab Spring, where 
economic statistics were manipulated (OECD, 2015). The size of unofficial economic activities, 
such as in the black market for employment, further raises the potential imprecision of data. 
Regardless of these caveats, we deem World Bank-, IMF- and ILO-data to be the most reliable 
data sources for this thesis. 
Real.GDP 
Real GDP represents the total gross value added in an economy. Deductions for depreciation 
of physical capital and depletion of natural resources are not included. By keeping GDP-data 
constant in a specific currency, one can evaluate dynamics in economic activity by removing 
the inflation factor. That is, one assesses changes in the volume of the economy. We have 
applied annual data in fixed local currency prices as supplied by the World Bank and OECD. 
In that sense, real GDP provides high validity as an indicator of economic activity. 
The relevant time series stretch from 1996-2019 over a 24-year period. This is due to the 
availability of data typically starting in the mid 1990s for most Arab states. As far as reliability 
goes, we perceive World Bank- and OECD-national accounts data as reliable data suppliers. 
Geographically, this paper is limited to the Middle East and North Africa. Challenges arise for 
certain years in specific countries when it comes to the measurement of real GDP. This is 
particularly relevant for countries such as Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Years of turmoil and 
conflict in the wake of the Arab Spring have disrupted the flow of information. For Syria this 
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is particularly challenging. However, for the countries under focus in this paper, lack of data is 
not an issue. 
Observing changes to real GDP as measured by constant national currencies allows for analysis 
of changes to economic volumes whilst adjusting for the impact of price fluctuations. This is 
beneficial upon assessing countries with occasional large swings in inflation as discussed 
below.   
Unemployment.rate 
Annual unemployment rates are supplied by the World Bank constructed on national estimates. 
These reflect the amount of the total labor force that is available for work, but at the time are 
not employed. It represents a central real economic indicator and is as such highly valid for the 
purpose of this paper. However, the matter of reliability is debatable. 
It may also occur that the relevant national institutions that calculate unemployment rates do 
not supply data in a precise manner. Notably, unemployment rates are based on national 
estimates which exposes the numbers to national biases. As such, reliability may be hampered. 
Furthermore, many Arab nations are diminished by large shadow economies and people seeking 
employment outside of official labor markets. These are important arguments to keep in mind 
when assessing unemployment in the Middle East. Although prone to criticism regarding 
reliability, as commented, we consider World Bank unemployment data to be the most reliable 
source for measuring this indicator. 
Youth.unemployment 
Annual youth unemployment rates are provided by the World Bank based on national estimates 
and are limited to ages 15-24 for both genders. On the topic of the Arab Spring, it is a central 
indicator to assess, as it is widely acknowledged that unemployment among the young has been 
a central source of grievance across the Middle East (ILO, 2011). This is particularly 
problematic as many Arab States have vast populations of young people, thereby aggravating 
the negative implications of high youth unemployment. Evidently, it is a highly valid indicator 
when assessing the economics of the Arab Spring.  
As far as reliability goes, similar challenges arise as for the total unemployment rate, national 
estimates, employment in the shadow economy, measurement methods. However, we perceive 




Annual inflation-data is provided by the World Bank measured along a consumer price index 
for a specific average basket of goods and services. As a financial indicator, inflation may 
express the temperature of an economy whether it is heating up or cooling down. In the case of 
the Middle East, inflation levels vary significantly across countries. However, at an aggregate 
level the MENA-region has displayed far higher inflation levels compared to the world average 
(ILO, 2009). As such, it is a valid indicator to assess when approaching the Arab economic 
landscape. The World Bank provides these data based on IMF-sources and is as such considered 
reliable. 
M3.–.broad.money.supply 
Data on broad money supply is provided by the World Bank based on IMF-databases measured 
in current national currency units. According to official websites, broad money is defined as 
encompassing all currency outside of banks, demand deposits except for those of the 
government, savings and deposits by private individuals, essentially currency that is not in the 
hands of central government or bank finances (World Bank, 2021). 
As such, broad money supply provides an impression of the flow of money within a population 
and can be symptomatic of an economy's pace thus also a listening post for the financial 
wellbeing of an economy. The latter implies high validity for M3 as an indicator. Furthermore, 
IMF data upon which the World Bank builds its database is considered reliable in the sense that 
it is measured using consistent methods across time. 
General-government.debt-(GGD) 
The International Monetary Fund maps general government debt as a percentage of GDP. They 
further define gross government debt as encompassing all liabilities requiring interest payments 
between a debtor and a creditor at a given point in the future. This entails credit volumes owed 
by states to international creditors such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the GCC. In addition, 
individual countries can be suppliers of such capital of which Saudi Arabia is a good example. 
Typically, one would expect such liquidity to dry out during a financial crisis, while demand 
rises among countries affected by a specific crisis (De Broeck, Dabla-Norris, End, & Mariknov, 
2018). That is, Arab states are expected to have displayed an increased demand for foreign 
capital flows in the wake of the Arab Spring. Evidently, government debt seems like a relevant 




Domestic manufacturing encompasses value added across sectors without accounting for 
deductions and natural resource degradation. This is also provided in fixed national currencies, 
thereby isolating the quantum-effects of changes to the economic landscape. As with GDP, data 
is provided by the World Bank. The relevant data sets are perceived as reliable, and valid for 
measuring changes to production volumes. As such, it can also bear witness of overall economic 
activity. 
Net-domestic.credits 
Annual data on net domestic credits as measured in current national currency units is put 
forward by the World Bank. It encompasses claims on the central government as well as on 
other sectors within the economy. Essentially, this indicator expresses the availability of funds 
from domestic lenders to borrowers in the relevant countries. Expectedly, such indicators would 
move upward during times of accelerating growth and economic activity (Central Bank of 
Ireland, 2021). As a financial indicator, domestic credits provide an impression of the liquidity-
volume in circulation within a country´s population, thus also a valid macroeconomic indicator. 
Being based on IMF- and World Bank-databases, we also deem it reliable. 
4.0 Methodology  
Throughout this section we will elaborate on the methodological approaches selected to assess 
the quantitative and qualitative data sets applied in the analysis. These are the HP-filter, 
integrated institutional development matrix, and correlation-calculations.  
 
4.1 HP-filter  
The Hodrick-Prescott filter is a tool developed by Robert J. Hodrick and Edward C. Prescott to 
create a trend based on time series data. It is a univariate approach where the data foundation 
from one section of time series represents the in-data, and the time series is smoothed out by 
minimizing the gap between the estimated trend and the observed value. By comparing 
observed time series with the trend one can unravel deviations from the estimated trend, and as 
such point towards positive or negative cycles for economic variables. Evidently, one needs to 
decompose an observed time series into a trend, a cycle, and an error component. The error 
component includes elements such as seasonality, but for simplification this error is considered 




𝑥𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑔𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡 , 𝜀𝑡)      (1) 
 
→ 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑔𝑡 , 𝑐𝑡)      (2) 
Arithmetically then, this yields the following:  
  
→ 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑔𝑡+𝑐𝑡      (3) 
 
For this paper, perceiving the error term as a part of the cycle component serves to look beyond 
the effects of factors such as oil price, which is significant for the economic performance of 
many Arab countries. As such, the focus can remain on events along the timeline that are more 
relevant in this case. The HP-filter minimizes the variance of the cycle component with a 
penalty for variance in the second difference of the trend component. As such, the HP-filter 
defines a trend, as expressed by 𝑔 = (𝑔𝑡 , 𝑔𝑡+1, . . . , 𝑔𝑇), of a time series 𝑥 = (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡+1, . . . , 𝑥𝑇) 




2 + 𝜆∑[(𝑔𝑡+1−𝑔𝑡) − (𝑔𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡−1]






The first expression indicates the cycle component, whereas the second indicates differences in 
trend growth rate. 𝜆 indicates the smoothness of the growth component. The rule of thumb 
when determining this value is (Johansen & Eika, 2000): 
- Monthly observations: 𝜆 = 14 400 
- Quarterly observations: 𝜆 = 1600 
- Annual observations: 𝜆 = 100 
For yearly data this is generally set at 100. Implicitly then, a lambda-value close to zero reduces 
the impact of cycles, whereas a higher lambda-value entails the opposite – that cycle 
components constitute important explanatory factors. Following from this, we can identify the 




,      (5) 
where 𝐼𝑛  is an 𝑛 ∗  𝑛 matrix, and 𝐹 constitutes the penta-diagonal 𝑛 ∗  𝑛 matrix. Looking at 


























































Cycles can be expressed by deducting the observed time series from the estimated trend, and is 
expressed as follows: 
𝑐𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡  −  𝑔𝑡      (7) 




2 = 𝑥𝑡  −  𝜆∑[(𝑔𝑡+1−𝑔𝑡) − (𝑔𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡−1]






As such, the cycle component on the left side of the equation (6) expresses the residual. We can 
then derive the following: 
𝑐𝑡 = 𝑥𝑡  −  𝜆∑[(𝑔𝑡+1−𝑔𝑡) − (𝑔𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡−1]




Throughout this thesis we will apply World Bank- and IMF-data in a HP-framework to establish 
the economic topography of Arab states before and after the Arab Spring revolts. Upon doing 
so, we present our results as natural logarithms to underscore percentage deviations from 
relevant trends. We then arrive at the following expression: 
 
log(𝑐𝑡) = log(𝑥𝑡)  −  log(𝑔𝑡)      (10) 
 
A smoothing parameter of 100 is the most relevant lambda-value for this paper as we assess 
annual macroeconomic data supplied by the World Bank. Thus, we will bring cycles from the 
trend to the surface. Upon evaluating the impact of large societal events this feature of the HP-
filter is useful. 
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Caveats to the HP-approach 
It is, however, important to underline some fundamental weaknesses of the HP-filter: 
 
• Lack of theoretical foundation: Although widely acknowledged, the HP-filter estimates 
potential economic values without applying economic theory and does not bother with 
definitions of economic parameters.  
• Endpoint challenges: The HP-filter is two-sided meaning that it estimates trends based 
on observations in 𝑡 − 1, 𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 + 1. The problem then arises that at the end of a times 
series there are no future values, and similarly at the start there will be no past values. 
Evidently, observations towards the endpoints of the time series affects the cycle values. 
• Real-time challenges: Running economic parameters, such as real GDP, through an HP-
filter may induce real-time problems. The freshest observations are often prone to 
revision, thus making data sources less certain. In addition, manipulation of 
macroeconomic data by national authorities may occur. These problems are further 
exacerbated by endpoint problems. 
 
Consequently, applying the HP-filter should include a problematization of the accuracy of the 
method. When evaluating cycles at the endpoints of data series it may occur that the magnitude 
of an estimated cycle is different from the actual size of the cycle. Such a discussion could for 
example revolve around the calculation of unemployment dynamics. It may well be that the 
Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU), so-called natural unemployment, 
behaves differently than what comes into expression in the data (ILO, 2011). This constitutes 
an analytical speedbump caused by the limited availability of data for Arab countries – most of 
which only have reported complete macroeconomic data from 1996. The estimated HP-trend 
may then be imprecise relative to the natural underlying trend. The limited quantum of data 
further underscores the potential gap between instrumental trends and natural trends. 
 
Furthermore, the Arab Spring and the ensuing security and political situation may have 
hampered the accessibility and credibility of some datasets. Particularly limited have been data 
for Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Iraq. Economic reporting among various Arab countries has been 
prone to criticism for being manipulated in favor of the reporting country, especially for weak 




4.2 Integrated institutional development index  
In addition to assessing purely macroeconomic factors, we will also construct an institutional 
development matrix. This allows us to shed more light on societal circumstances that may serve 
to enhance or dampen the magnitude of a crisis. Upon doing so, we will assemble data from 
indices along six dimensions each with two facets. These dimensions and their corresponding 
data providers are elaborated in the following. 
 
Fragility and stability 
• Fragile States Index (FSI): this is provided by the Fund for Peace, an organization that 
develops tools and collects global information to reduce conflicts through a focus on social 
and economic factors. The index consists of 12 parameters rated from 0 to 10, and the index 
itself is rated from 0 to 120 (The Fund for Peace, 2021). 
• Political Stability Index (PSI): measures the likelihood of government destabilization or 
overthrowing by non-peaceful means. It is provided by The Global Economy, ranges from 
-2,5 to 2,5 where the latter represents the highest level of political stability and is composed 
of several other indices from different sources (The Global Economy, 2021). 
 
Environment 
• Environmental Performance Index (EPI): encompasses a summary of sustainability 
performance across the world by evaluating 32 indicators along 11 categories. It is provided 
by the Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy and stretches on a scale from 0 to 100 
(Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy, 2021). 
• Environmental Health Index (EHI): measures to what extent a country successfully protects 
its respectful population from environment related health risks. It is a subcategory of the 
abovementioned EPI of which it constitutes 40%. As with the EPI, the EHI has a scale from 
0 to 100 (Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy, 2021). 
 
Freedoms and rights 
• Human Freedom Index (HFI): presents an overview of the state of human freedom along 
measures of personal, civil, and economic freedom. The index applies 76 indicators along 
12 dimensions, and rates countries with an aggregate score from 0 to 10, where 10 indicates 
complete freedom (CATO Institute, 2021). 
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• Index of Economic Freedom (IEF): covers 186 countries across 12 indicators of economic 
freedom indicators, such as financial- and property rights. The index rates countries on a 
scale from 0 to 100 (The Heritage Foundation, 2021). 
 
Socioeconomics 
• Doing Business Index (DBI): The World Bank ranks national economies on their business 
climate on a scale from 0 to 190 across 10 dimensions – each constituted by separate and 
equally weighted parameters. A high score on the index indicates a conducive regulatory 
environment for establishment and conduct of business (The World Bank, 2021). 
• Human Development Index (HDI): The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
measures human development and wellbeing across three primary categories; long and 
healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. These three categories have 
separate indices to quantify the sub-scales. As such, the HDI evaluates economic growth as 
a means of human development. The scale stretches from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates the 
highest level of development (UNDP, 2021). 
 
Gender 
• Global Gender Gap Index (GGI): provided by the World Economic Forum to capture the 
magnitude of gender-based inequality over time. The index measures scores across four 
main dimensions; economic, educational, health, and political. The 2020 report contains 
measures of 153 countries along 14 indicators within the four dimensions. The index 
stretches from 0 to 1 where 1 indicates complete parity between genders (World Economic 
Forum, 2021). 
• Gender Inequality Index (GII): The United Nations Development Programme measures 
gender inequality along three dimensions; reproductive health, empowerment, and 
economic status. These are constituted by five indicators. The index encompasses 162 
countries, and scales them from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates completely unfair conditions and 
0 indicates equality (UNDP, 2021). That is, the scale is inverse to the other facets of the 







• Democracy Index (DMI): The Economist Intelligence Unit assesses the status of 
democratic health in 165 countries along five main dimensions based on 60 indicators on a 
scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 10 indicates a perfect democracy (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2020). Further, it categorizes countries into one of four categories i.e., 
authoritarian regime, hybrid regime, flawed democracy, full democracy. 
• Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): Transparency International evaluates 180 countries 
according to expert and business perceptions of public corruption. The scale stretches from 
0 to 100, where 0 indicates high levels of corruption, and 100 indicates a clean economy 
(Transparency International, 2021). 
 
Mathematically we will construct a composite integrated institutional development matrix to 
quantify and express the status of vital institutional factors in the relevant countries. Our 





)1/𝑛 = √𝑎𝑖 × 𝑎𝑖+1 × 𝑎𝑖+2 × 𝑎𝑖+3 ×. . .× 𝑎𝑛
𝑛       (9) 
Where Π equals to the geometric average of the parameters, a, indicated from “i” to “n”. These 
values are derived from the abovementioned sources. The specific equation used to construct 
the composite integrated institutional development matrix includes the 12 indicators specified, 










= √𝐹𝑆𝐼 × 𝑃𝑆𝐼 × 𝐸𝑃𝐼 × 𝐸𝐻𝐼 × 𝐼𝐻𝐹 × 𝐼𝐸𝐹 × 𝐷𝐵𝐼 × 𝐻𝐷𝐼 × 𝐺𝐺𝐺 × 𝐺𝐼𝐼 × 𝐷𝑀𝐼 × 𝐶𝑃𝐼
12
     (11) 
 
The 12 parameters have been normalized to a 0 to 1-scale whereby a score closer to 1 indicates 
a positive score and a score close to 0 indicates poor institutional quality. The specified equation 




4.3 Correlation  
In addition to assessing macroeconomic parameters and institutional quality separately, it is 
relevant to evaluate the interconnection between the two. That is, our analysis will also delegate 
attention to their synergies. Upon doing so, the paper will elaborate on a scatter plot of GDP-
dynamics in the wake of the Arab Spring contrasted to the quality of institutions. Specifically, 
IIDI-values from 2010 and 2011 are applied to inspect negative impacts on GDP-development 
and potential contractions. Furthermore, a correlation-coefficient will be calculated to 
numerically reflect the covariation and explanatory power of institutions to economic 
dynamics. 
To construct the scatter plot of IIDI-GDP we will let the GDP-troughs constitute the x-axis, and 
IIDI-scores represent the y-axis. Upon doing so, the paper will include values for all Arab 
MENA. The purpose of this is to provide better grounds for comparison, as well as a more 
precise calculation of the correlation between IIDI-scores and economic dynamics. 
The correlation coefficient, R-squared, will be calculated to indicate whether IIDI represents a 
credible explanatory factor for post-Arab Spring GDP-dynamics. It is calculated as follows: 
𝑅2 = 1  −   
𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 (𝑆𝑆𝑅)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 (𝑆𝑆𝑇)
      (12) 
𝑅2 = 1   −   
∑(𝑦𝑖    −     ?̂?𝑖)
2
∑(𝑦𝑖    −    ?̅?𝑖)2
      (13) 
The value of R-squared will indicate if there is a considerable correlation, and if so to what 
extent and in which direction it goes. 
5.0 Outline  
This paper studies the economic causes and consequences of the Arab Spring by approaching 
the topic along two dimensions. Firstly, to evaluate a selected set of financial and 
macroeconomic indicators in the prelude and postlude of the financial crisis to map the 
economic terrain of a set of selected countries as well as the Arab World as a whole. Secondly, 
the paper investigates the stability of institutional frameworks to establish whether the relevant 
economic infrastructures were able to withstand and minimize the scale of the crisis. The 
institutional diagnosis of the specific countries may further concretize factors that constitute 
grievances, other than apparent economic ones, that may have played a part in the dismay 
among populations of Arab countries. This approach has been illustrated by Grytten & Koilo 
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(2019).  As such, the preliminary section of the analysis intends to unravel levels and nuances 
in the years leading up to the initiation of the Arab Spring in 2010-2011.   
  
Upon assessing the economic causes of the Arab Spring, this paper briefly mentions the effects 
of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 on the Arab economic landscape. Furthermore, dynamics 
for the Arab World as a whole and the GCC-countries are taken into consideration to provide 
grounds for comparison. Notably, our focus is on the Arab Spring, hence the financial crisis 
will be commented on but not analyzed thoroughly. 
The particular focus on the above-mentioned countries has to do with Egypt encompassing the 
largest Arab population in the MENA-region, Tunisia being the starting point of the unrest, 
Jordan and Lebanon being countries tainted, although not significantly altered, by 
demonstrations and protests. Furthermore, these countries have in common an absence of 
highly valuable natural resources, specifically oil and gas. As such, oil 
rich exporting countries of the Persian Gulf represent a different part of the Arab economic 
specter (World Bank, 2010). 
  
The paper applies structured time series analysis to divide trend- and cycle components to assess 
the stability of the selected indicators. This approach is present throughout the analysis both 
in the prelude and postlude of the Arab Spring. Consequently, positive or negative deviations 
from a calculated trend are perceived as either positive or negative cycles.  
  
Upon establishing trends, the paper utilizes data from the World Bank Database, the 
International Monetary Fund, as well as FRED economic data. The evaluation follows eight 
key macroeconomic indicators, subdivided into four real economic productive elements, as well 
as four financial indicators. These are the following:  
• Y: gross domestic product, fixed prices national currencies, the primary indicator of 
economic performance. 
• MP: manufacturing, value added, fixed prices national currencies, a leading procyclical 
indicator. 
• U: unemployment rate total, national estimates, a lagging countercyclical indicator. 
• U*: youth unemployment rate, ILO-estimates, a lagging countercyclical indicator. 
• M3: broad money supply, current LCU, a leading procyclical indicator. 
• C: net domestic credits, current LCU, a leading procyclical indicator. 
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• P: inflation rates, measured by changes in consumer price indices, a lagging procyclical 
indicator. 
• GGD: general government debt as percentages of GDP, current LCU, a lagging 
indicator that can be both pro- and countercyclical. 
 
5.1 Arab economic landscape pre-financial crisis  
When analyzing the economic development of the Arab countries during the time leading up to 
the Arab Spring, it is inevitable to mention the international financial crisis of 2007-2008. Upon 
observation of GDP-trends up until 2008 using the HP-filter, we see that GDP lays above trend. 
Arab nations have responded differently to the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Where some 
countries have visible dents in GDP, others appear to have experienced continued, although 
slower, growth also in the wake of the crisis. This is further elaborated on later in the 
paper. Consequently, economic dynamics occur differently across the region.  As discussed 
above, the eight mentioned macroeconomic factors will be studied by illustrating them relative 
to a trend. This trend is calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a lambda-value of 100 
corresponding to yearly values. 
 
5.1.1 GDP-development prior.to.the.financial.crisis 
To provide an impression of the status of economic activity across Arab nations prior to the 
financial crisis, the following contains HP-trend estimates for GDP in Egypt, Tunisia, 
Jordan, Lebanon, the GCC-countries, and the Arab World in the period 1996-2008.  
 
Figure 5.1 - GDP-development prior to the financial crisis.  
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As can be seen, GDP-values in 2008 lay slightly above trend-levels for 1996-2008 for all four 
countries. Similar tendencies can be seen for the Arab world as a whole as well as for the GCC-
countries: 
 
Figure 5.2 - GDP-development prior to the financial crisis.  
Observably across the Arab countries, economies show resemblance of booms. On a regional 
level, the oil-price boom between 2003 and 2008 has strengthened fiscal and external balances 
– particularly for the GCC-countries (IMF, 2010). Although some countries, such as the four 
specified countries in this paper, are net importers of petroleum products, the entire region is 
prone to dynamics in the oil-market. This channels through factors such as FDI and remittances 
(World Bank, 2010). Evidently, movements in the GCC-countries have spillover-effects on its 
Arab neighbors (Almarzoqi Albqami, 2010). As the focus of this thesis is to assess the economic 
causes and consequences of the Arab Spring, the financial crisis will not be further analyzed in 
isolation. Rather, it will be included as an element in the prelude leading up to 2010. 
6.0 Arab economic landscape pre-Arab Spring 
In the following section we will assess deviations from the estimated HP-trend along the eight 
macroeconomic indicators specified previously.  Trend-calculations will stretch from 1996 to 
2010 to express the status of the macroeconomic indicators on the doorstep of the revolts. For 
each of the four countries there will be an introduction, followed by figures illustrating the eight 
indicators with corresponding trends and cycles. Subsequently, these will be further elaborated. 
Finally, cycle estimates for all Arab MENA are illustrated for comparison. 
 
6.1 Jordan 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has been governed as a constitutional monarchy since its 
independence in 1946 and has enjoyed relative economic and political stability compared to its 
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neighbors (Helfont & Helfont, 2011). The kingdom shares similar social problems as its 
neighbors stemming from unemployment, corruption, poor governance, and other socio-
economic challenges. These grievances become further highlighted by the lack of valuable 
natural resources and poor economic performance. In tandem they may constitute threats to the 
nation as whole. As. the former Jordanian ambassador to the US indicated, the biggest threat to 
Jordan´s national security is young unemployed Jordanians (Helfont & Helfont, 2011). In the 
subsequent sections, the macroeconomic landscape of Jordan is elaborated. 
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Figure 6.2 – Unemployment and youth unemployment rate, Jordan, 1996-2010.  
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Figure 6.4 – GGD and manufacturing volumes, Jordan, 1996-2010.  
Real GDP 
In 2017, contributions to the Jordan economic output stemmed primarily from services, 
accounting for about two thirds of GDP, with industry and agriculture encompassing just below 
30% and 5% respectively (Index Mundi, 2020). Such relative sizes were also relevant prior to 
2010. Tourism alone had an estimated contribution to GDP of 12% in 2015 – an indication of 
the sector´s role in the Jordanian economy. The economic landscape is also highly influenced 
by its lack of essential resources such as water and oil and has made it highly reliant on foreign 
assistance (Index Mundi, 2020). Consequently, the Jordanian economy is vulnerable to 
international dynamics and regional turmoil not only directly, but also via central economic 
partners such as the US and the GCC. 
As shown in Figure 6.1, real GDP saw a dip towards 2010 after a period of moving above trend. 
Likely, this is partially attributable to the occurrence of the international financial crisis. 
Although the Jordanian economy has shown signs of real GDP growth over the relevant 15 
years, it seems as if the years following the financial crisis and preceding the Arab Spring 






























































































































































































































Jordan has had high rates of population growth, notably not compensated for by economic 
growth in the years before the Arab Spring. The Jordanian economy and labor market is small, 
open, and vulnerable to external shocks (Winkler & Gonzalez, 2019). According to Winkler & 
Gonzalez (2019), Jordan was affected by the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which stirred turmoil 
and instability, as well as the financial crisis of 2007/2008. Consequently, Jordan saw dents to 
its employment rates and former growth pace. As shown in Figure 6.2, unemployment rates 
stood at levels above trend for a few years and sunk below trend in the years preceding the Arab 
Spring. 
The booms and busts underscored in section Real GDP are mirrored in Figure 6.2. Notably, 
unemployment is a lagging counter-cyclical indicator to real GDP, so that GDP-growth may 
induce unemployment reduction in subsequent years. The unemployment rate stood at levels 
above trend for a few years but, interestingly, decreased in the years prior to the Arab Spring. 
This observation is notable in light of Arab populations´ economic grievances and motivations 
for the revolts, and indicates that unemployment rates were better than expected. 
Youth unemployment 
According to UNICEF, Jordan has one of the youngest populations in the world, with people 
under 30 constituting 63% of the total population (UNICEF, 2020). Consequently, youth 
employment becomes an important topic. In the beginning of the 21st century, youth populations 
across the Middle East held the leaderboard for an unfortunate combination of factors, the 
highest share of youth population and youth unemployment (Kabbani, 2019). At the same time, 
institutions and authorities underscored the importance of solving this social entanglement 
before frustration evolved into unrest. Figure 6.2 shows Jordanian youth unemployment.   
Youth unemployment indicates similar developments as overall unemployment – with a peak 
in 2002 of 32,4 %. On the flipside, the lowest levels of youth unemployment for the emphasized 
period were reached in 2008. In the years prior to the Arab Spring, times were seemingly better 
for young Jordanians than the trend would indicate. Notably, youth unemployment rates, 
although dauntingly high, stood at levels below trend in the prelude of the Arab Spring revolts. 
Inflation 
Being a small open economy, Jordan is prone to influence from market forces outside of its 
own borders. Consequently, price levels are no exception. Jordanian inflation is among other 
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things dependent on international oil prices as it is a net importer of petroleum products (Oxford 
Business Group, 2015). To further enhance the country´s dependency on external factors, 
Jordan receives most of its natural gas and oil from its neighborhood – specifically countries 
such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries (Fattouh & El-Katiri, 2012). Evidently, 
energy imports are typically attached to political obligations, and inflationary dynamics may be 
affected. 
As shown in Figure 6.1, inflation peaked in 2008 reaching levels close to 14% - a clear deviation 
from the trend in foregoing years. Also, 2009 entailed a deflation rate of -0,74% before 
increasing to 4,85% in 2010. High inflation in 2008 seems to coincide nicely with the economic 
boom and the relatively low levels of unemployment prior to the Arab Spring. Rapid changes 
in the inflation rate come into expression in the years following the financial crisis and 
preceding the Arab Spring. 
Broad money 
In the past, Jordanian broad money volumes have fluctuated significantly, ranging from 6,32% 
growth in 1998 to a 24,29% growth in 2009. Expectedly, broad money and domestic credit 
should display a positive correlation. Furthermore, it is expected that inflation will be tainted 
by such changes. 
Broad money volumes seem to have displayed relatively stable movements in the relevant 
period – with a clear upward-going trend as seen in Figure 6.3. Notably, in the years after the 
financial crisis and prior to the Arab Spring, broad money seems to have increased at a slightly 
higher pace than the trend would imply. Broad money stock appears to have been at its highest 
levels relative to trend in 1996 – although this may partially be attributed to static and historical 
features of the HP-filter. That is, values towards the flanks may be skewed in a close domain. 
Assuming that this does not represent an issue, we observe that broad money stock races past 
expected trend-levels in 2009 and 2010 – the years following the financial crisis and preceding 
the Arab Spring. 
General government debt 
In the period 1996-2010, Jordan has seen debt-to-GDP ratios ranging from well above 100% in 
the 1990s to the lowest level reached in 2008 with 54,20 %. According to the International 
Monetary Fund, prudential debt-to-GDP ratios are set at 40 % for developing countries and 
70 % for emerging markets – ratios far lower than what Jordan has displayed (Islam, Ishraq, 
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Rathin, & Raquel, 2012). In the past, Jordan has been burdened by government debts stretching 
above 200% of GDP in the early 1990s - illustrative of the country´s heavy indebtment. 
However, stricter economic policies and fiscal consolidation has seen this rate steadily 
decreasing up until 2008 (Islam, Ishraq, Rathin, & Raquel, 2012). 
The above-mentioned changes come into expression in Figure 6.4. After a long period of debt 
reductions, the Jordanian government´s debt-to-GDP ratio saw its first increase since the 
beginning of the millennium – an increase that continued through 2009 and 2010. As can be 
seen later in this paper, this ratio kept increasing in the years following the Arab Spring. The 
trend indicates that the ratio has steadily decreased in the relevant period, although at varying 
paces. In 2009 and 2010, however, the debt-to-GDP ratio seems to have been on the rise – 
deviating from the downward-moving trend earlier in the decade. 
Manufacturing 
The Jordanian manufacturing sector is second in size only to the services sector and contributed 
to approximately 18,17 % of GDP in 2016 (Allan, Kasim, Mustapha, & Shah, 2018). The same 
article underlines the increased levels of uncertainty stemming from regional developments 
connected to the Arab Spring. Particularly, instability in neighboring Syria and Iraq, often 
considered Jordan´s largest trade partners, have taken a toll on Jordanian exports and 
manufacturing sectors. In the time leading up to the Arab Spring, risks within and threats to 
Jordanian manufacturing were largely related to the political situation and safety conditions 
(Abbasi, Sandouqa, Al-Tahat, & Mukattash, 2007). 
Through the course of the selected years, manufacturing has steadily increased, albeit in varying 
paces, as seen in Figure 6.4. Jordan has seemingly enjoyed levels above trend for some time 
but seems to have entered a dip in the wake of the financial crisis. Seemingly, negative 
divergences from trend volumes in Jordan have occurred over the relevant period, in some cases 
coinciding with regional turmoil – such as the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. Notably, 
manufacturing stood at -3,61 % below trend in 2010 – just before the Arab Spring reached 
Jordan. 
Net domestic credit 
According to our analysis, net domestic credit volumes increased by an approximate 380 % 
from 1996-2010 and kept increasing in the years after the financial crisis – although at a slower 
pace initially. Notably, the growth seems to have accelerated in the middle of the 2000´s. Rising 
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volumes of domestic credit in developing countries, such as Jordan, appears to have been a 
trend in the financial markets of such states (Khaltarkhuu & Sun, 2014). According to our data, 
Jordan is no exception, as can be seen in Figure 6.3. 
Cautiously managing turbulence in financial markets has been essential throughout recent 
decades for Jordan – which has been adversely impacted by external factors (IMF, 2010). Being 
among the most open economies in the MENA-region implies vulnerability to international 
dynamics and requires prudent and resilient financial responses (Oxford Business Group, 
2016). Consequently, net domestic credit volumes are dynamic. 
As seems commonplace for the other macroeconomic indicators in Jordan, net domestic credit 
volumes appear to deviate from trend patterns connected to regional turmoil during the first 
decade of the 21st century. In 2003 net domestic credit volumes stood at 23,10 % below trend, 
and in 2008 at 14,08 % above trend. 
6.2 Egypt 
The Arab Egyptian Republic has been governed as a presidential republic since the Egyptian 
Revolution of 1952 when an organized group of army officers called the Free Officers 
Movement under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew and seized power from King 
Farouk (Goldschmidt, 2020). President Nasser became a leading political and a strong pan-
Arabist in the Middle East. Although officially named a republic, the country has in essence 
been governed by military regimes, only abrupted by its first allegedly freely elected president 
Mohammed Morsi who was removed from power in 2013 by the military (BBC, 2019). 
Evidently, the Egyptian economic situation has been tainted by military rule over a bloated 
public sector. This form of economic leadership has been accused of failing to provide inclusive 
growth and pull millions out of poverty (Abed, 2020). The Egyptian National Statistics Bureau, 
whose threshold for poverty has been placed lower than that of the World Bank, classified about 
a third of Egypt's population as poor in 2019 (The Economist, 2019). The progress on poverty 
had been positive from the second half of the 1990s but began to recede during the first decade 
of the 21st century (Philipp, 2020). In the wake of the Arab Spring, poverty and impoverishment 
became an even larger issue than it was prior to the revolts. 
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Figure 6.5 – Real GDP and Inflation, Egypt, 1996-2010.  
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Figure 6.7 – Broad money stock and net domestic credit, Egypt, 1996-2010.  





































































































































































































































































































































































































Contributions to Egyptian gross domestic product by sector stem from a more diverse portfolio 
than that of Jordan. In 2017, services accounted for an estimated 54 %, industry 34 %, and 
agriculture close to 12 % (Index Mundi, 2020). Similar weightings of these sectors are visible 
for the foregoing and following years. Notably. Egypt also has a large informal economy 
estimated to account for 30-40 % of the nation's economy (Mabrouk, 2020). Furthermore, a 
large contributor is the tourism industry. According to the World Travel & Tourism 
Association, this contributed an approximate 19,5 % to GDP in 2007, and fell dramatically in 
the wake of the Arab Spring (Oxford Business Group, 2020). 
Real GDP seems to have moved in cycles during the selected period as seen in Figure 6.5. This 
indicates cycles, booms, and troughs, in connection to regional and international events – such 
as during the American invasion of Iraq and the financial crisis of 2008. At the doorstep of the 
Arab Spring, real GDP seems to be slightly above trend calculations. As shown, GDP-cycles 
stood slightly above trend at the starting line of the Arab Spring. The wake of the financial crisis 
also seems to have brought upon the Egyptian economy a slight dip. 
Unemployment 
The Egyptian labor market is diminished by a largely bloated and inefficient public sector – an 
economic policy practiced throughout decades by Egypt´s military leadership (OECD, 2003). 
Privatization plans have been laid out on the table in the past to deal with these structural 
shortcomings. However, the plans would likely entail large numbers of layoffs, and have thus 
encountered fierce opposition. This is due to high unemployment rates in tandem with social 
tension and political uncertainty – a familiar combination of factors in Egyptian society. With 
generally high levels of unemployment, Egypt has struggled to ensure inclusive growth that 
creates jobs for new entrants to the labor market. 
Figure 6.6 indicates high unemployment rates around the middle of the 2000s, peaking in 2005 
at 11,20 %. Interestingly, unemployment rates stood at levels below trend in the closest years 
prior to the eruption of the Arab Spring revolts. 
Youth unemployment 
The employment situation is difficult for the general labor force, but even more grave for young 
Egyptians – particularly for women (Sieverding, 2012). According to the latter cited UN-
publication, more than 90 % of the unemployed in 2010 were categorized as young people. In 
 
 43 
addition, people aged 15-24 years constituted about a fifth of Arab populations in 2010 (Mirkin, 
2010). This youth bulge, and its poor integration into the labor market, has been and will remain 
a challenge for governments. Evidently, evaluating the state of youth unemployment becomes 
relevant when assessing the prelude of the Arab Spring. 
Youth unemployment rates seem to have followed an upward-going trend towards 2005 with a 
peak youth unemployment rate of 31,24 % as reflected in Figure 6.6. However, after that the 
trend seems to indicate concavity and a downward-going trend. By the end of 2010, at the time 
of Bouazizi´s self-immolation in Tunisia, youth unemployment stood at 24,53 % - a rate lower 
than trend-indication. It had nonetheless been consistently and dauntingly high. Not 
surprisingly, youth unemployment displays a pattern like that of overall unemployment. The 
cycle peaked in 2005 - standing at 13,96 % above trend-levels. Youth unemployment has long 
been a challenge to the Egyptian government, and remained troublesome up until, and 
following, the Arab Spring revolts (Van Eekelen, de Luca, & Ismail, 2001). 
Inflation 
Since the end of the stabilization program in Egypt in 1996, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) 
had been busy working to achieve various goals parallel to one another, oftentimes conflicting 
ones (Al Mashat, 2008). Among other things, the CBE strived to attain high levels of economic 
growth whilst also suppressing inflationary pressures and keeping a stable exchange rate. 
Interest rates were non-consistent and unpredictable, and as such a less effective tool in 
Egyptian monetary policies at the time. However, in 2005 the ECB initiated reforms and steps 
to facilitate inflation targeting to ensure better price stability. This implies the central bank´s 
new commitment to ensuring predictable prices rather than tandemly working to achieve the 
highest possible level of growth (Youssef, 2007). 
The estimated HP-trend in Figure 6.5 indicates an upward-going inflation rate in the relevant 
period, reaching a peak in 2008 of 18,32 %. Inflationary volatility in Egypt is caused by several 
factors, among other changes to international oil- and food prices, fiscal deficits, and increases 
in the broad money supply (Khan & Miller, 2017). Inflation rates fluctuate visibly above and 
below trend levels during the relevant period with spikes in 2004 and 2008. 
Unpredictable inflation rates are harmful for the capital investment climate, productivity 
growth, fiscal debt, and other central economic organs. The Egyptian Central Bank did not seem 
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to have succeeded in managing inflation in the relevant period. At the doorstep of the Arab 
Spring, Egyptian inflation stood at 11,27 % - somewhat lower than trend-indication. 
Broad money 
Broad money as a monetary aggregate became a more central part of Egyptian authorities´ 
policy framework after the Central Bank of Egypt initiated its transition towards inflation 
targeting (IMF, 2006). Evidently, money supply became a means of controlling inflation. The 
CBE stated at the time that any emergence of inflationary pressures would be met with 
tightening monetary policies. Government deficits are also at risk of requiring more finances 
from domestic banking systems, thus inducing an even larger strain on monetary aggregates. 
Consequently, broad money stock in Egypt has been determined by adverse factors 
As expected, the HP-trend displayed in Figure 6.7 indicates an upward-going development – at 
times displaying positive cycles. This is relevant for the years 2007-2010, whereas in the years 
prior to 2007 broad money stock stood at levels below trend. As expected, changes to broad 
money stock seem to coincide with inflation levels. Following the financial crisis and preceding 
the Arab Spring revolts, broad money stock seems to have grown at a higher pace than the trend 
would have indicated. 
General government debt 
In general, Egypt´s government debt has been high over the past few decades. This has to do 
with large fiscal deficits, varying real GDP growth, depreciation, and fluctuation in the Egyptian 
pound (Al Nashar, 2019). During better times and economic spurs, the Egyptian authorities 
have been successful in contemporarily reducing its debt-GDP-rate. Unfortunately, the general 
government debt has not been kept on a steady downward-going trajectory, although our trend-
calculations indicate a slight downward trend over the years 1998-2010. Rather, it has 
fluctuated visibly in time – a form of economic turbulence that may pull the Egyptian economy 
into an unfavorable macroeconomic imbalance. 
Although high rates of government debt are relatively common, particularly in advanced 
economies, it may pose challenges to the economies of middle income, low income and 
developing countries (Abdu, 2019). High rates of public debt in countries such as Egypt may 
serve to harm the efficiency of fiscal policy measures by Egyptian authorities, and large 
amounts of government debt rely on stable macroeconomic frameworks to be fruitful and 
efficient. Egypt, being a middle-income country and emerging market, should according to the 
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International Monetary Fund avoid surpassing a threshold of a 70 % debt-GDP ratio (IMF, 
2018). Notably, the quality of institutions also determines this threshold. 
Consistently up until 2008, the ratio stood at levels above the IMF-recommended threshold of 
70 %. In the last three years leading up to the Arab Spring revolts, government debt-GDP-ratios 
moved below 70 % for the first time since the IMF started measuring the parameter in Egypt. 
Figure 6.8 illustrates Egypt´s general government debt levels. 
Seemingly, 2007-2010 lightened the burden of general government debt in Egypt, although 
displaying signs of an increase in the last years preceding the Arab Spring. According to Al 
Nashar (2019), the GGD-ratio has primarily been affected by government primary deficits, with 
adverse impacts stemming from exchange rate depreciation, interest rates, and real growth. 
Manufacturing 
During the past century, manufacturing sectors of the Egyptian economy grew to account for 
an approximately 25 % of GDP (Little, 2021). The most significant contributors are found in 
pharmaceutical-, ceramic-, metal-, chemical-, and textile industries (OECD, 2007). Egyptian 
manufacturing strongly influenced, and in part drove, real GDP growth in the national economy 
during the first decade of this century. However, it appears as though the Egyptian economy 
and industry has fallen short in facilitating jobs in industries with a high degree of labor 
productivity, contributing to macroeconomic grievances such as high unemployment and real 
wages to lag real GDP growth (Morsy, Levy, & Sanchez, 2014). Due to data limitations, we 
have only been able to collect data starting in 2002 as seen in Figure 6.8. 
Seemingly, Egyptian manufacturing has experienced consistent growth in production volumes 
across the 9-year period assessed above. In the first few years following the financial crisis and 
preceding the Arab Spring, Egyptian manufacturing seems not to have been significantly 
affected by international market turbulence. Rather, times seem to have been better than trend-
indication for the manufacturing sector. 
The steady growth of manufacturing volumes in Egypt is consistent with its economic growth 
rates in foregoing decades. Being a leading macroeconomic indicator, developments in 
manufacturing volumes should precede similar movements in the overall economy. As such, 
the values for 2010 indicate that good times are to come. However, the status of the Egyptian 




Net domestic credit 
Net domestic credit volumes have been steadily on the rise in the Egyptian financial markets. 
According to our data sets, the 1996-2010 period brought with it an approximate 380 % increase 
in credit volumes. Such tendencies appear to be commonplace across developing countries and 
emerging markets (Khaltarkhuu & Sun, 2014). Throughout its history, Egypt has experienced 
noticeable dynamics in its financial sector. In the 1950s, then-President Nasser reduced the 
sector as a part of the ongoing nationalization process (Oxford Business Group, 2020). 
However, in later decades the Egyptian financial sector become increasingly accessible to 
international banks and other private financial institutions – thereby improving access to capital 
in the Egyptian domestic markets. 
The graphs in Figure 6.7 illustrate a relatively stable upward-going trend for domestic credit 
volumes in line with expectations for emerging markets and developing economies. Observable 
cycles occur, among other places, in 2004/2005, moving below trend for a few years before 
climbing above trend in the last two years before the eruption of the Arab Spring revolts. 
Interestingly, net domestic credit volumes stood at expected levels in 2008 and kept increasing 
in the following years. At the doorstep of the Arab Spring, net domestic credit volumes 
displayed a cycle of 3,35 % above trend. 
6.3 Tunisia  
Tunisia is a republic in North Africa that borders Algeria to the west, Libya to the east, and has 
a 1,148-km coastline to the Mediterranean Sea to the north. Tunisia’s history includes the 
Ottoman period from 1574 and became a French protectorate in 1881. It gained its 
independence in 1956. After that, Tunisia was a one-party state before the Arab Spring of 2010–
2011. The Tunisian people revolted against their president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, demanding 
democratic reform and regime change. They denounced his policies, his regime, and his corrupt 
practices and called for freedom, jobs, and dignity. Millions of young people demonstrated and 
resented the arrogance of cronyism, the widening inequality for economic opportunity, and the 
stifling of unauthorized speech in any form (Belhaj, 2021) 
Exposed to the global financial crisis of 2008, Tunisia's economy faced several challenges that 
fueled and triggered protests in 2010 and subsequent years. (Index Mundi1, 2020). Despite the 
democratization process in Tunisia after the regime change in 2011, several terrorist attacks, 
and barriers to economic inclusion have contributed to slow economic development and high 
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unemployment. In the subsequent sections, the Tunisian macroeconomic landscape is 
elaborated. 
Figure 6.9 – Real GDP and Inflation, Tunisia, 1996-2010.  
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Figure 6.11 – Broad money stock and net domestic credit, Tunisia, 1996-2010.  
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Real GDP  
The primary contribution to Tunisian economic output in 2016 was driven by the services sector 
(World Bank, 2017), which accounted for about 64 % of GDP. Industry and agriculture 
encompassed about 26 % and 10 % of GDP (Index Mundi, 2020). Such sector-weightings have 
been relatively consistent. Tunisia’s agricultural sector has grown steadily, and nearly 20 % of 
the country’s total workforce is employed in this sector (Fanack, 2020). The economic 
landscape is also highly dependent on tourism, which is a pillar of the Tunisian economy. It 
constitutes about 6,5 % of the GDP and upholds more than 400.000 jobs. This sector has 
suffered dramatically from social unrest and political turmoil, which has resulted in fewer jobs 
and the closure of many hotels (Fanack, 2020). 
As illustrated, real GDP from 2002 to 2006 moved below trend before it changes to moving 
above during the last half of 2006, probably due to good macroeconomic management and 
market-oriented reforms that took place in that period. Healthy economic policies, structural 
reforms, and the Association Agreement with the European Union in 1995 led to export growth 
and made it Tunisia’s largest trading partner (IMF, 2010). Tunisia weathered the international 
crisis relatively well. An average GDP growth rate of 5 % during the last decade demonstrates 
this. GDP cycles stood at levels above trend from 2007 and remained positive up until the Arab 
Spring. 
Unemployment  
Just like its neighbors, Tunisia’s unemployment rate is relatively high, which represents a major 
political, social, and economic challenge. The demand for jobs remains high in the labor market. 
Even when the GDP growth rate has been relatively high, Tunisia has not accomplished 
sufficient job creation. Furthermore, the demand for skilled labor is lower than the supply, and 
there is a mismatch between the skills needed and those produced by the country’s education 
and training system. Finally, inefficient, rigid regulations and institutions govern the 
functioning of the labor market (Boughzala, 2019).  
As illustrated, there has been a downward-going trend. Unemployment rates stood above trend 
from 1996 to 2001 and from mid-2001 to 2004, peaking in 1996 at 16 %. According to our 
analysis, unemployment rates declined by almost 3 % in the relevant period. Interestingly, 
unemployment rates stood at levels above trend indication in the years right before the eruption 
of the Arab Spring revolts. 
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Youth unemployment  
The unemployment rate in Tunisia is high, but it is much higher among the young. The younger 
generations were among the main driving forces behind the political and social upheaval that 
led to the fall of Ben Ali´s government in 2011. Structural constraints, poor economic growth, 
low demand for skilled workers, and the poor capacity of the Tunisia economy to create jobs 
partly explain high youth unemployment rates (ILO, 2013). 
As in the case for total unemployment, youth unemployment rates seem to have followed a 
downward-going trend towards 2006. However, as illustrated in the graph, unemployment rates 
changed in an upward direction during the financial crisis and in the years before the eruption 
of the Arab Spring revolts. 
 
Inflation 
Tunisia´s economic landscape was structurally designed to favor vested interests (Indexmundi, 
2020). However, the period after 1996 was characterized by the adaptation of the country's 
economy to free trade principles and a closer connection to the European economy. Tunisia 
joined the World Trade Organization in 1995, and in 1996 it signed an "Association Agreement" 
with the European Union (OECD, 2018). While becoming a more open economy, Tunisia was 
exposed to the influence of market forces beyond its borders. Furthermore, Tunisia´s authorities 
modernized the monetary policy operational framework toward inflation targeting in 2010 
(IMF, 2010). 
The graph shows that the inflation rate fluctuated significantly. On average, inflation was 3% 
in the relevant period. High inflation in 2008 matched the economic boom and the relatively 
low levels of unemployment before the Arab Spring. According to an IMF report (2010), the 
Central bank of Tunisia had to avoid inflationary pressures because of the accelerating credit 
growth, low real interest rates, and exceptional increases in the stock market index. 
Furthermore, the IMF reports that the Central bank of Tunisia had to maintain a close watch to 
ward off the risks of real estate and stock market bubbles and excessive credit growth (IMF, 
2010). As can be seen, inflationary cycles are visible in the years preceding the Arab Spring. 
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Broad money  
Tunisia's broad money supply increased during the relevant period, averaging nearly 11,5 % 
between 1996–2010. Expectedly, broad money and net domestic credit have grown in tandem, 
which becomes visible in Figure 6.11. 
Relative to the estimated HP trend, broad money volumes seem to have a small deviation under 
trend-indicator before the financial crisis.  In the years after the financial crisis and before the 
Arab Spring, broad money increased at a bit higher pace than the trend-indicator would imply.  
Broad money cycles are illustrated above. The percentage from trend peaked in 1996, with a 
significantly lower deviation (2.3%) in 2010. If the development in the years between is taken 
into account, the graph shows a clear gap in 2004 with a yet remarkable upward trend towards 
the years before the financial crisis. After the financial crisis and before the Arab Spring, broad 
money stock grew faster than the trend would have indicated.  
 
General government debt 
The debt-to-GDP ratio saw a steady decline from nearly 70 % in 1997 to 39.2 % in 2010. As 
mentioned earlier, the prudential-debt-to-GDP ratio is 40 % for developing countries, which 
Tunisia only managed to achieve in 2010. With this debt-to-GDP ratio, Tunisia was relatively 
insulated from potential short-term negative effects (IMF, 2010).  
 
As illustrated, the long period of debt reductions resulted from sound economic policies and 
structural reforms, underpinned by increased trade openness (IMF, 2010). Although the ratio 
had a definite downward trend during that period, this trend was reversed to a sharp upward 
trend to over 70 % debt-to-GDP ratio. As can be seen, the debt-to-GDP cycles has fluctuated 
above and below trend levels during the relevant period. 
 
Manufacturing 
Tunisia´s manufacturing sector has contributed to approximately 16% of the GDP on average 
over the relevant period. Tunisia is heavily reliant on European markets as three-quarters of its 
exports go to the EU (Oxford Business Broup, 2019). The decline in manufacturing from 2008 
to 2009 reflects a fall in exports of manufactured goods to EU countries (IMF, 2009). However, 
after shrinking in 2008–2009, manufacturing accelerated and reached a new all-time high in 




Net domestic credit 
According to our analysis, net domestic credit volumes grew by approximately 300 % during 
1996–2010. The Tunisian stock exchange index also experienced exceptional growth, reflecting 
strong earnings from listed companies, especially banks (IMF, 2010). At the same time, there 
was plenty of liquidity in an economy with relatively limited options for financial investments 
(IMF, 2010). 
As the figure shows, net domestic credit volumes saw a steady increase over the relevant period. 
It also seems to have coincided with broad money growth. Remarkably, after rapid growth in 
the late 1990s, credit growth decelerated between 2000–2006 due to concerns among Tunisian 
banks regarding credit quality and expanding credit volumes (IMF, 2006). Although 
developments have been stable overall, credit volumes seem to have been on the rise just before 
the Arab Spring. 
6.4 Lebanon  
Lebanon formerly enjoyed the status of a Middle Eastern banking hub.  However, geopolitical 
factors in recent decades have placed significant strain on its economy (Britannica; Indexmundi, 
2020). After its independence in 1943, Lebanon pursued a remarkably open economic policy 
but experienced significant political turmoil due to the Lebanese civil war between 
1975 and 1990, and subsequent conflicts with Israel in 1982, 1996, 2000, and 2006 (Hlasny, 
Araji, & Ichrakieh, 2019). These have harmed Lebanon´s economic infrastructure while 
derailing its position as a Middle Eastern banking hub (Thedora , 2020). Several banks and 
other foreign entities established in the country moved to Cyprus or Kuwait. As a result of the 
devastation of war and the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, the Lebanese infrastructure 
was weakened, and a large part of the industry was taken out of production. The weakening of 
state power during the civil war also led to increased corruption and less opportunity to collect 
taxes and fees. Throughout the 1980s, much of the trade was controlled by various parties, their 
military units, and their respective agendas. 
 
After the civil war, Lebanon embarked on an ambitious program of social and economic 
reconstruction (Britannica, 2020). Lebanon rebuilt much of its war-torn physical and economic 
infrastructure by borrowing heavily, mostly from domestic banks. This saddled the government 
with a huge debt burden. Despite Lebanon’s uneasy economic recovery, and after the Lebanon 
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War in 2006, real GDP grew significantly averaging 9 % during 2007–2010. The 
macroeconomic landscape of Lebanon is elaborated below. 
Figure 6.13 – Real GDP and inflation, Lebanon, 1996-2010.  
 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 6.15 – Broad money stock and net domestic credit, Lebanon, 1996-2010.  
 

















































































































































































































































































































































































The Lebanese economy is mainly driven by the service sector, which in 2017 accounted for an 
estimated 83% of GDP (Indexmundi, 2020). Lebanon is also an important agricultural country, 
where the sector traditionally accounts for a large share of employment and made up about 4 % 
of GDP in 2017 (Indexmundi, 2020). Furthermore, the country is relatively industrialized. 
Before the Lebanese Civil War, industrial production was stimulated by a relatively rich 
domestic market, but the sector suffered both during the war and after. This was partly due to 
the Israeli invasion in 1982. A large part of the factories was destroyed, and many were not 
rebuilt. However, Lebanon is still more industrialized than most other states in the Middle East. 
The industry sector accounted for about 13 % of GDP in 2017 (Indexmundi, 2020). As is the 
case for Tunisia and Jordan, Lebanon has a limited supply of valuable natural resources. 
As indicated in Figure 6.13, real GDP was affected by the Lebanon war and international 
events, such as the financial crisis in 2008. Before 2006, one can see that real GDP is descending 
and is slightly below trend. After the war and during the financial crisis in 2008, real GDP grew 
fast towards 2010. 
Unemployment 
As mentioned, Lebanon has greatly suffered due to war and conflict. The destruction caused by 
this has resulted in displacement of people, brain drain, collapsed systems, and a general decline 
in inhabitants’ incomes and economic activity (ILO, 2018). Lebanon’s society features a sharp 
class division, with remarkable differences between urban and rural areas and rich and poor 
(Maged, 2019). The social tension and economic problems in the relevant period were 
intensified by high unemployment. Turmoil weakened all sectors of the country’s economy i.e., 
small scale farming, transportation, and tourism, thereby causing destruction to the livelihoods 
of many Lebanese citizens. 
Figure 6.14 indicates a slight reduction in unemployment rates before a sharp correction occurs 
prior to the Lebanon War. Unemployment rates peaked in 2007 at 9 %. Interestingly, rates 
swiftly changed from peak levels to bottom levels in 2009. Cycles are particularly noticeable 
around 2006.  
Youth unemployment  
Lebanon, alongside the other countries studied, suffers from high youth unemployment.  The 
youth unemployment rate averaged approximately 21 %. That is more than double the general 
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unemployment rate (8 % average) in the relevant period. Lebanon´s limitations on the job 
supply side play a part in high youth unemployment. The country creates more educated job 
seekers than the domestic labor market needs, thus struggling to create social and economic 
opportunities for young citizens that match their education and expectations (Kawar & 
Tzannatos, 2012). 
Youth unemployment rates followed a stable trend towards 2004 before a sharp correction 
occurred with a peak rate of 23 %. After that, rates sunk to a record low in 2009. Not 
surprisingly, the pattern was like that of total unemployment. 
 
Inflation  
Since we do not have data on inflation from the time before 2009, this will be further elaborated 
in Section 7.4. Nonetheless, we want to briefly comment on what we know about the period. 
Being a small dependent economy, Lebanon became extremely vulnerable to external price 
shocks (Ariss, 2012). Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, which decided to adopt inflation targeting, 
Lebanon targeted price indices. Price indices are designed to track inflation by measuring the 
change in the level of prices. Monetary authorities use this indexation as a critical reference to 
control inflation. In Lebanon, the price index used to track inflation is the consumer price index 
(CPI), which is the average price paid by consumers for a basket of goods and services (Ariss, 
2012). In 2009, the inflation ratio was 1,19 %, and in 2010, it rose to 3,98 %. According to an 
IMF report (2010), this rise was partly driven by fuel prices.  
Broad money  
Lebanon´s broad money volumes have fluctuated significantly, ranging from the lowest growth 
of 4,49 % in 2004 at the doorstep to the civil war, to the highest growth of 19,62 % in 2008. 
Not surprisingly, the broad money stock underwent an upward trend and averaged an annual 
increase of 11.5 %. Specifically, volumes were below trend between 2001 and 2008, whereas 
it stood above it in 2009–2010.  
 
Broad money stock was at its highest levels relative to trend prior to the Arab Spring. The 
lowest cycles occurred around 2006. After the war, following the financial crisis, and preceding 




General government debt  
Regarding general government debt, we do not have data before 2000. However, we can still 
consider 2000–2010. Lebanon´s government-debt-to-GDP ratio is among the highest in the 
world, and almost half of it is denominated in foreign currency (IMF, 2010). The IMF further 
reports that lowering the government debt-to-GDP ratio is the top medium-term priority for 
Lebanese authorities. This is precisely to reduce Lebanon´s financial vulnerability. The report 
also warns that the debt-to-GDP ratio could become explosive if the economy suffers a negative 
shock.  
 
The government-debt-to-GDP remained high during the relevant period, averaging 163 %. As 
illustrated in Figure 6.16, Lebanese government debt increased from 2000 and reached a peak 
in 2006. After that, debt levels were reduced towards 2010. This can be explained by stronger 
growth, which boosted revenues, the reintroduction of gasoline excises, and better spending 
discipline (IMF, 2010). Not surprisingly, 2006 was when debt-to-GDP saw its largest cycle at 
13 %.  
Manufacturing  
Lebanon is a relatively industrialized country, with varied light industries and heavier industries. 
Before the Civil War (1975–1976), industrial production was stimulated by a relatively rich 
domestic market, but the country’s industries were damaged by turmoil and conflict. The impact 
of war on the textile industry was especially severe (Britannica, 2020). Although manufacturing 
experienced downturns due to regional instability in the relevant period, the construction 
industry fueled much of the post-war economy (Britannica, 2020). 
 
During 1996–2010, manufacturing increased at varying paces. Seemingly, negative cycles in 
Lebanon have occurred over the relevant period since mid 1999. Notably, in the years leading 
up to the Arab Spring, manufacturing volumes increased at a slightly higher pace than the trend 
would imply. Negative cycles in Lebanon occurred over the relevant period, which in some 
cases coincided with regional turmoil - such as the invasion by Israel in 2006. Moreover, 
manufacturing volumes stood at 4,85 % above the trend in 2010 - just before the Arab Spring.  
Net domestic credit  
According to the available data sets, net domestic credit volumes increased by approximately 
354 % during 1996-2010. As mentioned earlier, such tendencies are commonplace across 
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developing countries and emerging markets (Khaltarkhuu & Sun, 2014). Figure 6.15 illustrates 
a relatively stable upward trend for domestic credit volumes. Observable cycles occur, among 
others in 2004–2005, moving below trend for a few years before rising again. 
 
6.5 Arab MENA including the GCC-countries 
In the above sections we have elaborated on macroeconomic developments for four specific 
countries up until 2010, thus mapping the years preceding the Arab Spring. The purpose is to 
show the situation at the doorstep of the revolts to unravel potential macroeconomic red flags. 
We have conducted identical analyses along the same indicators for all Arab countries across 
the Middle East and North Africa-region (MENA) – including the GCC-countries. This is done 
to better understand the overall circumstances of the Arab Spring, as well as to consider the 
diversity among Arab economies and the adverse effects of international and regional loss of 
economic and political stability. 
Although we have chosen to place particular emphasis on Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, 
we acknowledge that other Arab countries would be interesting subjects of analysis. Upon 
assessing the economic status of the remaining Arab states, we have constructed a table that 
illustrates macroeconomic cycles across the region in 2010. GCC-countries are highlighted with 
a red background color, the four countries of focus in blue, and the remaining Arab MENA-
countries with a beige color. Green numbers indicate positive cycles, red numbers indicate 




Table 6.1 – Macroeconomic cycles in 2010, Arab MENA.  
As illustrated above, only two countries display overall negative real economic symptoms. 
These are Algeria and the United Arab Emirates respectively. Notably, these are two adverse 
economies prone to different financial and real economic climates. When it comes to assessing 
the dynamics of the GCC-countries, it is relevant to point out the remarkable wealth division 
between these and other Arab nations. This is due primarily to the prevalence of oil and gas 
resources in the Arab Gulf which has tied GCC-countries closer to the global economy making 
them more directly vulnerable to international dynamics. However, these valuable natural 
resources have also made GCC-countries more economically resilient than many of their 
neighbors in the region. Notably, non-oil producing Arab neighbors appear to have been 
particularly debt dependent during tough times (Fouad, et al., 2007). 
As commented above, the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 had adverse impacts on Arab 
countries, some of which tainted by reductions in tourism flows, foreign direct investment, and 
reductions in oil prices (Vittorio, 2012). Arab states were affected by changes in the economic 
climate stemming from the financial crisis. However, the extent to which the crisis made a dent 
in Arab economies has varied from country to country. In Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates real GDP contracted by approximately 2 % and 5 % respectively in 2009 (World Bank, 
2021). In comparison, none of the four countries of focus in this paper experienced similar 
Real GDP Manufacturing Unemployment Youth unemployment M3 Credit Inflation GGD
12,13 %-13,03 %1,67 %
-71,30 % -31,19 %85,55 %
8,17 % ID -7,72 %
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economic drawbacks (World Bank, 2021). In fact, the gloomiest change in GDP between the 
financial crisis and the Arab Spring were reductions of GDP growth to rates of 3,04 % for 
Tunisia in 2009, 4,67 % for Egypt in 2009, 7,08 % for Lebanon in 2009, and 2,32 % for Jordan 
in 2010. Presumably, the immediate effects of the global financial crisis did not induce 
shrinking GDP in the four relevant states. These observations provide insight into the 
macroeconomic circumstances at the starting line of the Arab Spring. 
7.0 Arab economic landscape post-Arab Spring 
In the foregoing sections, we have elaborated on macroeconomic conditions prior to the 
eruption of region wide revolts towards the end of 2010 and the start of 2011. The purpose of 
this approach is to unravel potential economic grievances and symptoms of dismay that may 
have tilted the cup for populations across Arab States. In the following sections, we will shed 
more light on the economic landscape in the wake of the revolts. We do so by evaluating Arab 
economies along the same eight parameters assessed prior to preliminary uprisings in Tunisia 
and Egypt. The approach will be similar. That is, based on World Bank data we will construct 
an HP-trend with a smoothing parameter of 100 for annual data. 
However, to establish the end of the time series for the construction of an HP-trend, it becomes 
relevant to ask whether there has been an end to the Arab Spring or the lack of a clear end to 
the Arab Spring. Some researchers argue that the bulk of significant demonstrations took place 
in the first few years succeeding the Tunisian Revolution (Hamid, 2017). This would entail 
limiting the duration of the Arab Spring to 2010-2013. In contrast, other researchers point to 
ongoing conflicts and developments, or lack thereof, that to this day taint the region. As a result 
of this, the following analysis encompasses data from 1996 up until the most recent available 
data. 
To isolate the far-reaching negative impacts of the covid-pandemic in 2020 and 2021, we limit 
the estimation of cycles to 2019. This allows us to inspect immediate as well as longer-term 
consequences of the Arab Spring while ruling out the impact of the ongoing pandemic. 
Evidently, this also enables assessment of lagging macroeconomic indicators that respond 





Jordan was largely spared the devastating unrest that tainted its neighboring countries after 
protests erupted across the region (BBC, 2013). Protests were initiated in early 2011, shortly 
after the spark ignited the fire in Tunisia in December 2010. Jordanians held and expressed 
grievances along socio-economic dimensions demanding for better job creation and an end to 
systematic public corruption.  Jordan, being a longtime debt burdened country, was obligated 
by the IMF to reduce its energy and fuel subsidies in 2012, whereafter demonstrators clashed 
with security forces inducing casualties among the protestors. However, because of the ruling 
monarch King Abdullah’s seeming transition towards a more democratic regime, Jordan 
dodged the regime toppling wave that swept across the region (Ryan, 2018). In the following, 
Jordan’s macroeconomic dimensions during 1996-2019 will be elaborated on with a particular 
focus on the years following the Arab Spring. 
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Figure 7.2 – Unemployment and youth unemployment rate, Jordan, 1996-2019.  
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Figure 7.4 – GGD and manufacturing volumes, Jordan, 1996-2019.  
Real GDP 
Although Jordan experienced relatively calm seas with minor adjustments to ways of 
government compared to its immediate neighbors, domestic and regional unrest affected the 
economic pulse of the country (Diwan, 2016). Transit trade via Syrian infrastructure 
encompassed significant portions of Jordanian imports and exports prior to the war with 30 % 
and 11% respectively (Werman, 2019). Internally, increasing uncertainty for investors and 
troublesome trade routes have caused capital flows to dry out and exports to shrink. 
Furthermore, glooming security risks, radicalism, and a handful of terrorist attacks have tainted 
Jordan´s status as a tourist destination (Mustafa, 2018). By 2015, the number of tourist arrivals 
had shrunk by about 41% since the start of the Arab Spring. (Oxford Business Group, 2016). 
Observably, Jordanian GDP has kept increasing after the Arab Spring although at an apparent 
slower pace than foregoing years. From 2011 until 2019 it seems as though trend and actual 
levels move closely in tandem. GDP-cycles come clearer into expression by assessing the 
graphs in Figure 7.1. GDP-values have behaved similar to trend estimates in the years following 
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This bears witness to the absence of an actual economic recession in Jordan, and the presence 
of an economic growth slowdown post Arab Spring. 
Unemployment 
Although unemployment rates in the Jordanian labor market in 2010 were lower than what trend 
estimates would indicate, protests erupted in the country with one of the main grievances being, 
namely, unemployment. However, unemployment rates do not seem to have improved in the 
years that followed. Rather, conditions have worsened, and continued protests stretching from 
2011 up until 2019 are rooted in economic dismay and unemployment (Abouzzohour, 2021). 
The topic of political change is still on the table, but the Jordanian population faces a dilemma, 
aiming for structural and political change whilst at risk of compromising national security. 
Nonetheless, Jordanian authorities seem to have failed in improving labor market conditions in 
the wake of the Arab Spring.  
Unemployment rates in Jordan stood at levels below trend for the first few years following the 
start of the Arab Spring revolts but saw a steep incline in the period 2014-2016 peaking at levels 
of 15,27 %. This can be seen in Figure 7.2. For the relevant period, average unemployment 
rates stood at 13,77 %. Being a lagging indicator, unemployment rates are expected to express 
changes to the overall economy after some time has passed. Evidently, the Arab Spring did not 
bear with it fruits of fortune for the Jordanian labor market. At its peak in 2016, unemployment 
rates were an estimated at 10,11 % higher than trend-estimates would indicate. During the 
period assessed, this is an unmatched negative cycle. The graph also illustrates that the last few 
years prior to the Arab Spring were not extraordinarily tough in the labor market. Conditions 
had, however, been consistently poor over many years. 
Youth unemployment 
In general, high levels of youth unemployment is a sign of poor economic management and 
weak utilization of a country´s labor resources, but it is also closely connected to topics of 
political stability (Alawad, Kreishan, & Selim, 2020). Consistently, high levels of general 
unemployment have tainted the Jordanian economy – with particularly high levels of youth 
unemployment. These rates are alarming taking into consideration that an approximately 63 % 
of the Jordanian population are below 30 years old (UNICEF, 2020). The threat of youth 




Although well educated, Jordan's young population generally struggles to find jobs, especially 
relevant ones. Protests in 2011 and subsequent demonstrations throughout the past decade 
pointed towards economic grievances, especially persistently high youth unemployment, as a 
motivational backdrop to the Arab Spring. Evidently, curbing unemployment issues and 
streamlining labor market dynamics should be an area of focus for Jordanian authorities.  
Youth unemployment rates fluctuated slightly for a few years in the wake of the Arab Spring. 
The period 2014-2016, however, brought about record levels peaking in 2016 with rates of 
35,63 %. Evidently, citizens that took part in protests and demonstrations in 2011 and 
subsequent years seem to not have had their grievances heard. Rather, conditions appear to have 
worsened. Relative to trend, youth unemployment saw its lowest rates in 2014 with a -9,02 % 
cycle and rates of 28,49 %, before rising to an 8,63 % cycle impact and rates of 35,63 % in 
2016. 
Inflation 
Although Jordan has been economically strained by its immediate neighborhood being tainted 
by violent conflict, the country has performed relatively well (Oxford Business Group, 2015). 
In 2015, a few years after the eruption of the Arab Spring, the IMF forecasted that lower oil 
prices, among other things, would contribute to swifter fiscal consolidation, and that 
inflationary pressures thus would be reduced. The IMF also forecasted stable growth and 
consistent stability. Such prospects of sustained growth would indicate healthy inflation levels, 
as inflation typically represents a procyclical lagging economic indicator. However, the 
forecasted GDP growth did not occur, with forecasts for 2016 and 2017 standing at 4,5 % whilst 
actual growth stood at approximately 2 %. Evidently, expected inflation levels were also 
affected.  
Throughout the relevant time series, displayed in Figure 7.1, inflation has fluctuated from peak 
levels in 2008 of 13,97 % to trough levels of -0,88 %. That is, the Jordanian economy showed 
symptoms of overheating prior to the financial crisis and displayed deflation in both 2015 and 
2016 - half a decade into the Arab Spring. Deflation of -0,74 % was also the economic reality 
in 2009. Spikes and troughs in inflation levels come clearly into expression – particularly in 




In Jordan, broad money supply has been an important financial policy tool contributing to 
economic growth (Al Qudah, 2016). Being a leading indicator to the real economy, we expect 
this macroeconomic indicator to affect and be affected by dynamics stemming from exogenous 
shocks. It has positive correlations with credit volumes and inflation and is expected to move 
procyclical. 
Trend-estimates display an upward-going development as is in line with the law of demand. 
This implies that an increase in the supply of money may lower the price for borrowing, and as 
such, an increase in consumption and lending (Ross, 2020). Expectedly then, an increase in 
broad money should induce higher consumption and larger volumes in circulation within the 
economy. Broad money cycles display similar dynamics as cycles in real GDP as shown in 
Figure 7.3. This is according to expectations. During the first years of the 2000s, volumes were 
below trend indication, whereas in 2009 actual levels tipped above it. The Jordanian economy 
saw broad money volumes contract in 2011-2012, 2013-2014 and 2016-2017 by 2 %, 4.16 % 
and 0.04 % respectively. 
General government debt 
By the time the financial crisis struck the international markets, Jordan´s debt-to-GDP ratio had 
been reduced from 220 % in 1990 to 54,2 % in 2008. By the start of our time series, in 1996, 
the ratio stood at 115 %. At the starting line of the Arab Spring, it had shrunk to 59,4 % - up 
5,2 % percentage points from 2008-levels. 
Tainted by persistent budget deficits, the Jordanian economy has been consistently dependent 
on foreign aid and direct assistance to its budgets during the past decade (Sowell, 2016). 
Evidently, Jordan´s fiscal policy is kept afloat by international support. Budget deficits are 
largely induced by food- and energy subsidies, a bloated public sector and vulnerability to 
regional dynamics. Particularly, electricity and energy imports from neighboring Egypt are a 
key factor for the significant debt increase in Jordan. Egyptian gas pipelines were attacked by 
insurgents on the Sinai Peninsula in 2011, and slow repair work forced Jordan to turn to more 
expensive alternatives. As such, the Jordanian economy has been affected directly by fears of 




The above-mentioned dynamics of Jordan´s debt-GDP-ratio come into expression in Figure 
7.4, displaying an increase of 18,6 percentage points from 59,4 % in 2010 to 78 % in 2019. This 
is well above the IMF-threshold for preferable debt levels among countries in Jordan´s income 
bracket (JSF, 2019). Debt reductions prior to the financial crisis and Arab Spring revolts come 
into expression. The wake of the Arab Spring brought about increasing debt levels and induced 
debt cycles above trend. 
Manufacturing 
In the ensuing instability of the Arab Spring, Jordanian manufacturing sectors saw some of their 
most pivotal target markets stirred. The war in neighboring Syria, revolution in Egypt, and 
eventually emergence of ISIS and other fundamentalist groups in Iraq all induced large 
uncertainty and concern in Jordan´s immediate neighborhood (European Investment Bank, 
2016). Furthermore, transit trade of manufacturing goods via trade routes in, for example, Syria 
has been made difficult if not impossible. Consequently, export- and manufacturing volumes to 
countries such as Syria and Iraq decreased. As became apparent, a diversification of export 
destinations, and a reduction in trade volatility, are important challenges to the Jordanian 
manufacturing sector. 
According to Figure 7.4, Jordanian manufacturing volumes have grown steadily over the 
period. However, the pace with which volumes have grown seems to have slowed down slightly 
in the wake of the financial crisis and Arab Spring. Manufacturing sectors also seem to have 
behaved according to trend-indication in the years that followed. 
Net domestic credit 
During the first decade of the 21st century, up until the financial crisis of 2008/2009, net 
domestic credits increased by 266 % - displaying average annual growth rates of 17,62%. In 
the wake of 2008 and the years that followed the Arab Spring, domestic credit growth seems to 
have decelerated. The high credit growth rates were accompanied by an average real GDP 
growth rate of 5,9 % during 2000-2007 (WTO, 2008). After 2008, and the years that followed 
the Arab Spring, economic growth slowed down – so did domestic credit volumes. However, 
both kept growing. In tandem with such developments, Jordan has made progress in 
establishing firm and better defined social and financial institutions to replace family- and 
tribal-based systems (IMF, 2004). 
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Cycles above trend occur in 2008-2009, and 2011-2014. Net domestic credit volumes have not 
shrunk at any point in our data sets as seen in Figure 7.3. However, notable annual increases 
took place in 2007 and 2011 with 24,77 % and 14,89 % respectively. 
7.2 Egypt 
By the time the revolutionary spirit of the Jasmine Revolution had reached Egypt´s borders, 
hopes had grown high across the Egyptian population. 18 days after the eruption of unrest, 
protestors received news that long-time president Hosni Mubarak had resigned, and that the 
military stood behind the popular demands of Egyptians (Elshamy, 2021). However, as time 
passed and no free elections were announced by the interim rulership of the military, political 
polarization became increasingly visible. The counter-revolution had placed new rulers in the 
position of power, and in the years that ensued political leadership had undergone frequent 
changes. President Morsi, a representative of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, became the 
first freely elected president of Egypt but was overthrown by the military and replaced by Adly 
Mansour, who within a year was replaced by incumbent President Al-Sisi. Evidently, political 
turbulence tainted the Egyptian context in the aftermath of the Arab Spring – in addition to 
deepening economic and financial challenges such as drained foreign currency reserves and 
daunting unemployment rates (Tabaar, 2013). In the immediate aftermath then, there was 




Figure 7.5 – Real GDP 1996-2019 and inflation 1996-2018, Egypt.  
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Figure 7.7 – Broad money stock and net domestic credit, Egypt, 1996-2019.  






































































































































































































































































































































































































































The eruption of protests and revolts across the MENA-region incurred large fiscal costs on 
several Arab nations, reaching close to 20 % of GDP in both Saudi Arabia and Algeria 
(Ianchovichina, 2018). In Egypt, however, the fiscal cost of state-responses amounted to GDP 
of between 1 and 5 % of GDP. The oil-rich GCC-countries facilitated mainly bilateral support 
agreements with Egyptian authorities - although adverse in the sense that Qatar supported the 
Morsi Muslim Brotherhood-government and other GCC-countries supported the military-
regime of Al-Sisi. After the removal of the Morsi-government, Egyptian authorities received 
an estimated $35 billion from July 2013 to March 2015 from the four pro-military GCC-
countries Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Oman. 
Such support was earmarked for alleviating budget pressures of Egyptian authorities and 
facilitating improvement of economic grievances. However, chronic economic issues, such as 
vast energy subsidies devouring up to a third of Egyptian budgets, have continued to taint 
economic circumstances (Sayah, 2014). Furthermore, Egypt´s tourism industry, which 
contributed to approximately 17 % of GDP in 2010, took a significant blow as tourist arrivals 
shrunk due to the worsened security and stability situation. Tourism receipts, that is money 
spent by international tourists when staying in Egypt, shrunk from $13.633 billion in 2010 to 
$3.306 billion in 2016 – a staggering -75.8 % reduction (World Bank, 2021). Evidently, in 
addition to facing fiscal, budgetary, and unemployment challenges, the Egyptian economy 
remains tormented by political- and security threats.  
In the wake of the Arab Spring, Egypt´s real GDP dipped to levels below trend and remained 
lower than trend-indication from 2012 to 2017 as shown in Figure 7.5. Economic performance 
on an aggregate level seems to have improved towards 2019. The Egyptian economy reached 
peak cycle levels in 2010 3,80 % above trend, and a trough in 2014 at -2,46 % below trend. 
Unemployment 
Although Egyptians uttered demands of better employment conditions and more job creation at 
the starting line of the Arab Spring, there is little to show that things have improved. In the 
wake of protests, rather, it appears as if conditions have stagnated or even worsened. A daunting 
feature of Egyptian unemployment, and many Arab countries´ unemployment-status, is that it 
is particularly high among more educated (Mottaghi, 2014) – whereby over 30 % of people 
with tertiary education stood without work. Furthermore, educated young people tend to strive 
for public sector and government jobs – which is prone to suspicion by the general population 
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for being tainted by elitism and favoritism. Evidently, although many jobseekers stretch for 
employment in inefficient and bloated public sectors, a large majority believes that networks 
and connections are essential for acquiring such jobs. This touches on the issue of corruption – 
one of the core grievances expressed during protests in Egypt throughout the Arab Spring 
(Ianchovichina, 2018). 
Another core challenge of the Egyptian labor market according to Ianchovichina (2018) is the 
persistently large and growing informal sector. Here, Egyptians find work with low wages 
without social security and protection – as well as it not being captured by the overall Egyptian 
economy. Estimates of Egypt´s informal sector indicate that it encompasses roughly 40-50 % 
of its total GDP (Adly, 2019). Presumably then, this sector provides employment not captured 
by official institutions.  
Across the time series, unemployment rates in Egypt display an upward-going trend flattening 
out towards 2018 as seen in Figure 7.6. Notably, the highest levels of unemployment were 
found in the wake of the Arab Spring in 2013 at 13,15 % with a 13,01 % cycle. Seemingly then, 
the Egyptian revolution and ensuing uncertainty and instability brought upon the Egyptian labor 
market a negative shock – as can be seen by the 2010 to 2011 increase in unemployment from 
8,76 % to 11,85 %. 
Youth unemployment 
Although young protesters in Cairo´s Tahrir Square and elsewhere were filled with optimism 
and hope in 2011, there is little evidence to show that such hopes have been fulfilled. Rather, 
empirical findings indicate the opposite, and the same grievances that were relevant at the 
starting line of the Egyptian revolution remain relevant. Over the past decade, demonstrations 
and protests have consistently tainted Egypt´s context (Safi, 2019). As has been the case for 
general employment rates, conditions have not been visibly improved for the country´s youth. 
Furthermore, Egyptian authorities have fallen short in facilitating economic growth that 
captures new entrants to the labor market and have not been able to utilize human capital in the 
form of educated young people (Mottaghi, 2014). Such factors may serve to preserve, and even 
enhance, frustration.  
Not surprisingly, youth unemployment displayed similar tendencies as general unemployment 
– shooting up in the first few years after the start of the Arab Spring. In 2012 youth 
unemployment rates reached its highest levels in the time series at 34,46 %, as shown in Figure 
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7.6. The same year indicated a 12,06 % cycle. In the decade following the Egyptian revolution 
of 2011, youth unemployment rates have stood consistently above 30 %. Evidently, the 
economic grievances that spurred Egyptian protests remain – partly due to a reprioritization 
from economic issues to security- and political concerns (Kabbani, 2019). 
Inflation 
Over the past 10 years since protests were first initiated in Egypt, inflationary pressures have 
been consistently high due to an accelerating consumer price increase (Khan & Miller, 2017). 
Prices levels have been particularly volatile in the foregoing decade because of oil price 
changes, fiscal deficits, food price increase, and a swiftly growing flow of money supply. The 
latter will be elaborated on in the subsection Broad money. Consistently high inflation levels 
were commonplace. In 2017, however, inflation spiked to record levels of 29,51 % according 
to our data sets. This can be observed in Figure 7.5.  
The trend-estimate indicates an upward-going trend across the time series. Notably, this is likely 
heavily impacted by the inflationary spike in 2017 at 29,51 % - numbers considered high even 
in an Egyptian context. This is largely due to an average 7 % annual depreciation of the national 
currency across 2011-2015, as well as decision in 2016 by the Egyptian Central Bank to 
depreciate the Egyptian pound by 13 % (Khan & Miller, 2017). The latter is considered part of 
Egypt´s move towards inflation targeting rather than maintaining fixed exchange rates.  
Evidently, depreciation found its way through increased import prices and thus affected 
inflation levels in 2017 significantly, as shown in Figure 7.5. Apart from 2017, which may be 
considered an anomaly, the inflation cycle peaked in 2008 93,01% above trend-indication, and 
dipped to -38,46 % below trend in 2012. It is worth mentioning that any trend calculation, and 
consequently also cycle-estimates, were impacted by the 2017 inflationary spike. 
Broad money 
Prior to the Arab Spring, broad money stock in Egypt displayed overall growth – although at 
varying annual paces. In the years ensuing the first protests, this trend persisted – at times with 
annual increases far larger than those seen earlier in the time series. According to the quantity 
theory of money this should have a direct impact on price levels – as elaborated under Inflation. 
Drawing on this, inflationary dynamics should to some extent also come into expression in the 
stock of money. 
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The daunting inflationary pressures have been driven by several factors. Among others, 
misguided fiscal policies and currency-supply increases that ultimately contributes to further 
devaluation, hampered purchasing power among Egyptians, and pricier food baskets (Megahid, 
2017). Evidently, broad money volumes have an impact on the overall performance of the 
Egyptian economy and affect numerous factors on a macroeconomic level.  
Peak inflation levels in 2017 of 29,51 % coincide with a sharp increase in broad money of 
39,51 % and 20,45 % for 2016 and 2017 respectively. See Figure 7.7. Notably, cycle-estimates 
displayed above are tainted by the large increases in broad money towards the end of the time 
series. This means that although the period 2010-2015 indicates cycles below trend, the same 
period also entailed an overall 95,62 % increase in broad money stock. The abovementioned 
fiscal measures, such as depreciation and reduction of subsidies, have worked in tandem with 
inflows of large international IMF-loans to impact Egyptian finances such as the broad money 
stock. In any case, tendencies such as these may be worrisome for the overall economic 
performance of Egypt (Khan & Miller, 2017). 
General government debt 
Although Egyptian authorities have been successful at keeping government debt levels at bay 
during fruitful economic times, and at times even reducing its debt, the country´s 
macroeconomic context has been tainted by high debt-GDP-ratios. Notably, the aftermath of 
the Egyptian revolution and the years following the Arab Spring have brought upon the 
Egyptian government increased debt levels and fiscal imbalances. According to the IMF, 
Egyptian authorities did well in reducing their debt levels towards 2019 (IMF, 2020). This is 
not to say, however, that the country has gone clear of its neck-deep debt-burdens.  
As seen in Figure 7.8, Egyptian debt-GDP-ratios were significantly reduced from pre-Arab 
Spring levels of 98,30 % in 2005 to 66,80 % in 2008. After the financial crisis, the ratio crawled 
up to 69,60 % in 2010 at the doorstep of the Egyptian revolution. By 2013, Egyptian authorities 
were faced with a burdening 84 % debt-GDP-ration that kept increasing until it reached its 
summit in 2017 at 103,20 %. Evidently, government indebtment has remained a challenge 
throughout the relevant time series. 
Manufacturing 
The Egyptian manufacturing sector in the aftermath of the Arab Spring was tainted by increased 
instability, uncertainty, and reduced foreign investment flows to Egyptian industries (Bahgat, 
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2015). The issue remains that industrial sectors and political elites are heavily intertwined – that 
is, military-connected companies are clearly present across food-, health, and industrial 
manufacturing-sectors (Acemoglu, Hassan, & Tahoun, 2016). This militarization of Egypt´s 
economic body is exacerbated by the military´s expansion into signing deals with foreign firms, 
production of solar panels, chemicals, automotive components, and computer circuits (Ali, 
2020). Hence, the fragile situation persists that those in power politically and economically, are 
also the same ones that have the capacity to repress the population by force.  
According to our data sets, Egyptian manufacturing volumes displayed consistent growth up 
until 2011, averaging an annual 4,78 % across 2002-2010. Egypt also displayed an aggregate 
growth of 45,3 % in the same period as seen in Figure 7.8. However, 2011 brought about 
decreased manufacturing volumes amounting to -0,95 %. This is in clear contrast to foregoing 
years and is symptomatic of the effect instability and uncertainty may have on Egyptian 
manufacturing sectors. Notably, the pace increased after 2011, but it did not resume its former 
growth. In fact, during 2011-2019 Egyptian manufacturing volumes displayed an average 
annual growth rate of 2,64 % and an aggregate growth rate of 23,19 %. 
Net domestic credit 
In the years following the Egyptian revolution of 2011, net domestic credit volumes have kept 
growing at a relatively rapid pace. According to our data sets, 2016 alone entailed a 39,18 % 
increase. Simultaneously with this credit expansion, Egypt has not succeeded in reaching 
equivalent real GDP growth to pre-revolution levels (Haddad & Hakim, 2015). Consequently, 
credit growth has not been accompanied by compatible GDP-growth, thus indicating a lack of 
economic recovery despite the presence of credit growth. However, it may also be that the 
negative impacts of the Arab Spring would have been graver had the exogenous shock been 
followed by a “credit-less” response. Haddad & Hakim (2015) underscore that although the 
impact of bank credit on economic growth is ambiguous, it does not mean that it is negligible. 
They further emphasize that, in the case of Egypt, their findings merely cast doubt on net 
domestic credit´s ability to lead an economic recovery.  
Facilitating healthy recovery and further economic growth would, among several factors, 
depend on access to finance for private firms and other actors in the private business landscape 
in Egypt (Morsy et al., 2014). However, research underscores that financial development in 
tandem with strong institutions is adamant to ensure sustainable and inclusive growth 
(Mohieldin, Hussein, & Rostom, 2019). The challenge remains that the authorities, for the most 
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part constituted by the Egyptian military, are involved in all aspects of Egypt´s economy, and 
that financial markets as a whole are state governed. Egypt´s institutional strength is further 
elaborated under 8.0 Integrated Institutional Development Matrix (IIDI). 
According to our data sets, net domestic credit volumes in Egypt displayed an overall 421,84 % 
increase across 2010-2019 – indicating an average annual credit volume growth of 20,15 %. 
This can be seen in Figure 7.7. The highest year-on-year-growth of domestic credit volumes 
occurred in 2016 with 39,18 %. Evidently, estimated credit cycles are visibly tainted by the 
recent decade´s rapid credit growth. 
7.3 Tunisia  
The 2010 and 2011 protests in Tunisia are commonly considered the beginning of the Arab 
Spring, and they quickly spread to other countries in the region. It all started on December 17, 
2010, when a fruit vendor in Tunisia, Mohammed Bouazizi, set himself on fire in protest against 
the government. Many Tunisians identified themselves with Bouazizi's life situation, which 
triggered an uprising that spread from the small town of Sidi Bouzid to several parts of the 
country, including the capital Tunis. The revolution, also called the Jasmine Revolution, was a 
nonviolent revolt against the regime. Widespread unemployment, rising food prices, and a lack 
of respect for fundamental human rights were some of the causes for the uprising. The 
protestors demanded democratization and the removal of the incumbent regime. Large 
demonstrations and riots were met with violence by police, and hundreds of people lost their 
lives in the clashes that followed. The uprising forced President Ben Ali to resign, and a new 
government was installed (Britannica, 2021). A new democratic constitution was also adopted 
and implemented in 2014. Tunisia remains the most successful example of democratization 
after the Arab Spring (United Nations Association of Norway, 2020). 
 
However, the economic challenges in Tunisia remain. Corruption and high unemployment, 
especially among young people, are problematic. Social unrest and several terrorist attacks, 
including those to the country's tourism industry, lead to insecurity and slow-moving economic 
growth. Following the social and political riots between 2011 and 2015, the country took large 
loans from the IMF, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank, which resulted in 
high foreign debt that will take a long time to repay (United Nations Association of Norway, 





Figure 7.9 – Real GDP and inflation, Tunisia, 1996-2019 
 





















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7.11 – Broad money stock and net domestic credit, Tunisia, 1996-2019.  
 













































































































































































































































































































































































































Since the revolution of early 2011 and the economic decline shortly thereafter, the Tunisian 
economy embarked on a moderate recovery. Nonetheless, the country is currently facing 
headwinds from increased security threats and social tensions, which in many ways outweigh 
the benefits of the seemingly successful political transition (IMF, 2015). At the same time, 
Tunisia must navigate through a challenging environment marked by slow growth in trading 
partners, spillovers from regional conflicts, lower international oil prices, and a European Union 
in recovery (IMF, 2015). 
The economic landscape in Tunisia was severely affected in 2011. Both events in Tunisia and 
the conflict in neighboring Libya harmed domestic markets and reduced remittances from 
Tunisian diaspora. Real GDP declined to below trend and experienced a recession of -1.92 %. 
However, as can be seen in Figure 7.9, Tunisia has recovered from the shock in 2011. Tunisian 
GDP has kept increasing after the Arab Spring and appears relatively stable albeit slow. 
 
Unemployment rate   
As a result of the economic downturn and the return of Tunisian diaspora in Libya due to the 
eruption of war, the unemployment ratio witnessed a sharp incline in 2011 (IMF, 2012). 
Furthermore, labor markets reforms implemented to break away from the weight of the old 
labor system, combined with continuous political tensions, led to increased unemployment rates 
(Bouazza, 2019). Increased security threats and social tensions also exacerbated the 
employment context. Among other things, Al Qaeda's presence in North Africa strengthened in 
the aftermath of the Arab Spring. So did ISIS´ presence. Furthermore, instability in neighboring 
Libya added concerns about the security situation (CIPE, 2013). 
Seemingly, unemployment rates have recovered over the years compared to the year when the 
revolution arose in 2011. Nevertheless, the unemployment rate remained higher compared to 
pre-Arab Spring levels. Unemployment cycles are illustrated in Figure 7.10. For the relevant 
period, average unemployment rates stood at 14.85 %. Despite various labor support programs 
from successive governments, many Tunisians claim that their conditions have worsened 
(Bouazza, 2019). At its peak in 2011, the unemployment rate is estimated at a 24 % cycle.  
 
Youth unemployment rate   
The employment situation is difficult for the general labor force but is even worse for the young 
generation in Tunisia. Like many Arab Spring countries, Tunisia has experienced a youth bulge. 
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Still, according to the Center for International Private Enterprise (2013), neither that nor the 
lingering effects of the financial crisis can entirely explain Tunisia’s high youth unemployment 
rate. The high ratio results from structural issues in its education system and labor market (CIPE, 
2013). At the time of Bouazizi´s self-immolation in late 2010, youth unemployment stood at 
29,49 %. Within one year, this had risen to 42.63 %. 
 
Not surprisingly, youth unemployment displayed a pattern like that of overall unemployment. 
Youth unemployment rates stood at levels above trend estimates in the doorstep to the 
revolution and sank below trend in mid-2013, although remaining at a higher level than before 
the Arab Spring. Spikes come into expression in the first year of the Arab Spring, but as 
illustrated in Figure 7.10. Although youth unemployment rates were lower in 2018 than in 2011, 




Trend-inflation in Tunisia has increased throughout the relevant period, thus dimming 
Tunisians’ purchasing power. Reasons for price increases are, among others, account deficits, 
lack of supply, and continued depreciation of the dinar (Kadria & Mohamed Safouane, 2015). 
Furthermore, instability in the neighborhood was also a driving force for the inflation pressure. 
During the Libyan crisis, the black market was set in high gear, and substantial quantities of 
exports were driven to the country. The high volumes of exports to Libya and smuggling 
activities at the border resulted in a shortage of several essential foods in Tunisia. Many 
Tunisians sold goods to Libyans at higher than market prices, thus driving prices upwards in 
Tunisia (The African Development Bank, 2013). Inflation peaked in 2018 at 7.31 %. As can be 
seen in Figure 7.9, inflation cycles are clearly visible. 
 
Broad money 
Tunisia's broad money supply increased during the period, displaying average annual growth 
rates of 8.37 % during 2010–2019. As mentioned, broad money and domestic credit should 
display a positive correlation, evidence of which comes into expression when 
elaborating domestic credits. Broad money volumes displayed relatively stable cycles with a 
clear upward-going trend. 
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General government debt  
By the time the Arab Spring struck Tunisia, their debt-to-GDP ratio had been reduced from 70 % 
in 1996 to 43 % in 2011. However, post-revolution debt-to-GDP reversed and had increased to 
over 72 % by 2019.  Since the revolution in 2011, Tunisia obtained nearly 36 billion dollars in 
loans and donations from parties, such as the European Union, the World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund, as well as donations from international aid (Bouazza, 
2019). According to the International Monetary Fund (2019), Tunisia's public debt is 
sustainable. However, the risk has increased significantly, whereby stress scenarios identify 
significant risks. Examples as such are depreciation in exchange rates, poor fiscal and monetary 
policy, and contingent liabilities, especially if combined with persistently lower growth (IMF, 
2019). Furthermore, the same report posits that strong policy implementation will be paramount 
to achieve the envisaged debt reduction, which is set as an ambition by 2024 (IMF, 2019).  
 
The above-mentioned dynamics of Tunisia´s debt-GDP-ratio come into expression in Figure 
7.13. Over the past decades, there are some differences. After a long period of debt reductions, 
the Tunisian government´s debt-to-GDP ratio saw its first large increase in 2010. By 2018, 
general government debt had increased to 78.20 %. In 2010 it stood at 39.20 %. 
 
Manufacturing 
Tunisia has Africa's sixth-largest manufacturing industry (Oxford Business Group, 2019). Its 
geography plays a major role, offering direct access to the Mediterranean and proximity to the 
European market. However, in the post revolution years, manufacturing industries experienced 
a slowdown in production. This was due to more frequent labor disputes, increased instability, 
a decline in capital expenditures and technological development, and increased international 
competition (Oxford Business Group, 2019). The challenges were far from negligible, where 
social disputes led to disruptions in production and weakened investor confidence. 
 
Seemingly, trend estimates for manufacturing indicate concavity. That is, it has been flattening 
out in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. However, through the course of the selected years, 
manufacturing, in total, has increased. Tunisia benefits from some fundamental features, such 
as a developed industrial infrastructure, location close to the European market, and an efficient 
logistics infrastructure (Oxford Business Group, 2019). Tunisia enjoyed positive manufacturing 
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cycles before the Arab Spring. However, as Figure 7.12 illustrates, negative cycles have been 
dominant in later years. Notably, manufacturing volumes shrunk both in 2011 and in 2019. 
 
Net domestic credit  
Net domestic credit volumes have been steadily on the rise in Tunisian financial markets. 
Before the Arab Spring, net domestic credit volumes increased by an approximate 302.6 % 
during 1996-2010. In the years that followed the Arab Spring, domestic credit growth 
accelerated slightly, averaging annual rates of 11.35 %. Even in 2011, net domestic credit 
volume grew by 17.36 %, although real GDP contracted by -1.92 %. Figure 7.11 
indicates a clear upward-going trend for domestic credit volumes. Credit cycles peak post-Arab 
Spring peaked in 2018. 
 
7.4 Lebanon  
Lebanon has a small open economy with few restrictions on trade and capital flow. The 
economy is mainly composed of service industries, agriculture, banking, and tourism. The 
country has few natural resources and industrial products, thus being heavily dependent on 
importing goods. The country´s investment climate suffers from issues due to lack of well-
designed regulations, chronic political instability, and regulatory transparency, as well as high 
investment costs (Araji et al., 2019). 
 
Since 2011, the Syrian crisis has had spillover effects on Lebanon', putting more pressure on 
the country’s fiscal and economic system. By 2014, the number of Syrian refugees reached one 
million due to an open-border policy (UNHCR, 2014). According to UNHCR (2014), this made 
Lebanon the country with the highest per-capita concentration of refugees worldwide. 
Moreover, the country´s former connection Syria’s economy and its need to deal with a massive 
influx of refugees increased social tensions and heightened competition for low-skill jobs and 
public services. About 30 % of the country's Syrian refugees are unemployed (FN, 2020). In 
addition, the uprising in its eastern neighborhood caused fears that the conflict would spread to 
Lebanon. 
 
The recovery from the recent conflict in 2006 with Israel was on a good path. However, the 
refugee influx, and poor economic conditions associated with corruption and lack of 
transparency has shunned foreign investors and tourists away (FN, 2020). According to the 
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United Nations (2020), around 27 % of the population lives below the national poverty line. In 
the following subsections, Lebanon´s macroeconomic dimensions during 1996–2019 will be 
elaborated. 
Figure 7.13 – Real GDP 1996-2019 and Inflation 2009-2019, Lebanon.  
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Figure 7.15 – Broad money stock and net domestic credit, Lebanon, 1996-2017.  


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lebanon bolstered impressive economic growth from 2007–2010, but regional uncertainty 
brought an end to this. According to our data, the average growth rate was 9.15 % during that 
time. while the following four years only mustered an average growth rate of 2.42 %. Growth 
decelerated to 0.87 % in 2011, as real estate related activity, construction, and tourism were 
affected by increasing uncertainty and deteriorating security situation (IMF, 2014). The 
outbreak of protests and uprisings over the MENA region, and above all the uprising in Syria, 
dramatically impacted Lebanon (IMF, 2014). According to the United Nations, the refugee 
influx reached one quarter of the population, fueling already high poverty, and straining public 
services and local communities.  
 
In the wake of the Arab Spring, Lebanon's real GDP saw a cooldown. As can be seen in Figure 
7.13, growth rates decelerated, and in 2018 and 2019 the economy contracted by -1.93 % and -
6.70 % respectively. Hence, Lebanon´s economic position remained quite challenging and even 
worsened after the Arab Spring. 
 
Unemployment  
When elaborating the employment situation in Lebanon, it is inevitable to mention the more 
than 1 million Syrian refugees (IMF, 2014). This profoundly impacted the labor market. The 
unemployment rate among refugees was around 30 %, and more than 60 % of them work in the 
low-skilled sector  (ILO, 2013). They have also been willing to accept much lower wages than 
Lebanese workers. As a result, Lebanese workers may be displaced if they do not accept the 
same wage. Even before the Arab Spring and the Syrian crisis, Lebanon had been unable to 
create sufficient jobs. According to the World bank (2012), 3800 jobs were created per year, 
which means that there was one job for every six new entrants to the labor market in 2005–
2009 (World Bank, 2012). Across the times series, unemployment rates in Lebanon 
displayed a downward-going trend flattering out towards 2019. Interestingly, unemployment 
rates have been relatively stable during the past decade. 
 
Youth unemployment 
Although young Lebanese demanded job creation at the start of the Arab Spring, there has been 
little evidence of improvement. Due to persistent problems, thousands of young Lebanese 
people voiced their anger and took to the streets of Beirut in 2019 (Financial Times, 2019). 
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As mentioned earlier, high levels of youth unemployment in itself were a symptom of poor 
economic management and weak utilization of a country´s labor resources, but they were also 
closely connected to political stability (Alawad, et al., 2020). 
High levels of youth unemployment have consistently tainted the Lebanese economy. This is 
largely due to an absence of political stability, poor economic growth, and unsuccessful labor 
policies. These factors have contributed to high unemployment and affected the government’s 
ability to create jobs and deal with the problem (Araji et al, 2019). There are few signs of 
improvement over the past decade. As illustrated in Figure 7.14, youth unemployment has been 
consistently high between 17-18 %. 
 
Inflation 
In the wake of the Arab Spring, inflationary pressures rose despite tepid economic activity 
(World Bank, 2013). According to the World Bank, they rose due to both domestic and external 
factors.  Domestic ones can mainly be attributed to an increase in disposable income in early 
2012 due to the rise in minimum wages and wage costs in the public sector. Simultaneously 
there was a cumulative output that remained positive following several years of strong growth 
between 2007–2010. In 2015, however, Lebanese prices deflated by 3.75 %, and 2016 saw a 
further 0.78 % deflation. The war in neighboring Syria put pressure on domestic prices due to 
the influx of refugees and consequent consumption increase. In addition, cheaper Syrian goods 
had to be replaced by more expensive alternatives (World Bank, 2013). Figure 7.13 illustrates 
Lebanese inflationary dynamics. 
 
Broad money 
Broad money growth as a monetary aggregate depends on Lebanon´s overall economic activity.  
Slow output growth is reflected in slow broad money growth (Araji et al., 2019).  Lebanese 
broad money growth stood at an annual average of 11.93 % during 1996-2010, whereas it 
averaged 5.99 % during 2010-2017. Cycles peaked in 2010 at 6.04 % above trend. This bears 
witness of a cooldown in Lebanon´s broad money growth. These dynamics coincide with 
visibly reduced GDP growth rates in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. 
 
General government debt 
Lebanon´s economy is small, highly dollarized, and an open structure that it is exposed to both 
internal and external factors. The Lebanese economy has been burdened by high levels of debt, 
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and a high structural financial deficit for decades. Since the crisis began in Syria in 2011, debt 
accumulation accelerated due to additional government spending on education, health, and 
electricity services to cope with the refugee crisis (Araji et al., 2019).  
According to Trading Economics (2020), Lebanon was the fifth most indebted country in the 
world in 2020 after Sudan, Japan, Venezuela, and Greece. The Lebanese government has been 
unsuccessful during economic downturns as persistent debt levels and budget deficits limit 
fiscal maneuverability. The government encountered a trade-off between medium- and long-
term fiscal sustainability and short-term counter-cyclicality and chose the first one, which had 
a devastating impact on the entire economy (Dakhlallah, 2021). After having reduced its general 
government debt to 136.80 % in 2010, Lebanon saw its indebtment increase to peak levels of 
174.50 % in 2019. These dynamics are illustrated in Figure 7.16. 
 
Manufacturing 
With the instability ensuing the Arab Spring, the Lebanese economy was extremely vulnerable 
to sources of domestic instability, as well as to exogenous risks. Since the Syrian crisis of   2011, 
more strain was put on Lebanon's economic growth and fiscal position. The most important 
markets and the only overland trade line into the Gulf region was nearly annihilated because of 
the war in neighboring Syria (Rosiny, 2018). Furthermore, drawing from a World Bank 
Enterprise survey, manufacturing sectors met many domestic constraints. These are factors that 
drive up costs and thus impede competitiveness. The most important constraints identified by 
enterprises were political instability, corruption, access to electricity, finance, and high taxes 
(World Bank, 2016). All these factors had an adverse impact on Lebanon's manufacturing 
development. Compared to the rest of the Middle East, Lebanon’s manufacturing industry 
performs poorly (World Bank, 2016). Manufacturing volumes grew in the first years following 
the Arab Spring and peaked in 2013. After that, these numbers have declined, and within 2018 
manufacturing volumes had shrunk by 19.35 %. Figure 7.16 illustrates these dynamics. 
 
Net domestic credit 
Net domestic credit volumes increased by approximately 258 % during 1997-2010, averaging 
an annual growth rate of 11.71 %. In the wake of 2008 and the years preceding the Arab Spring, 
domestic credit growth increased at a high pace, which coincides with contemporaneous growth 
in real GDP and broad money.  After 2010, however, economic growth slowed down. So did 
domestic credit volumes. However, both broad money and domestic credit kept growing, 
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although at a slower pace. During 2010-2017, credit volumes averaged an annual 7.51 %. Credit 
cycles in this period appear modest and are illustrated in Figure 7.15. 
 
7.5 Arab MENA including the GCC-countries 
In the above sections we have elaborated on macroeconomic developments for the four 
specified countries during 1996-2019, thus mapping the years preceding and following the Arab 
Spring. The purpose is to construct an overview of the situation in the wake of the revolts to 
substantiate on macroeconomic reactions and developments. Furthermore, the intention of the 
analysis is to elaborate on whether the economic grievances that were decisive for protests in 
2010 have been dealt with. As with the case under section 6.5, we have conducted identical 
analyses along the same indicators for all Arab countries across the Middle East and North 
Africa-region (MENA) – including the GCC-countries. Presumably, economic, and political 
diversity is expected to have come into play when Arab countries were faced with this 
exogenous shock. 
The past decade has entailed varying developments across the MENA-region – both politically 
and economically. This is perceived as a reflection of the diversity that exists across Arab states. 
In the prelude of the Arab Spring, countries were forced to deal with massive turbulence in the 
international markets. However, the degree to which Arab countries were affected varied 
greatly (Behrendt, Haq, & Kamel, 2009). 
In the wake of Bouazizi´s self-immolation, countries in the region saw vastly different popular 
responses. In Syria and Libya war erupted in 2011 – conflicts that still rage on to this day. In 
2014, war erupted in Yemen when a fragile political transition went wrong and Yemen´s Houthi 
population took advantage of President Hadi´s lack of success in managing unemployment, 
corruption, and food security (BBC, 2020). All three countries have seen, and still see, high 
degrees of direct and indirect intervention from foreign powers. Other Arab states, such as those 
investigated closer in this paper, have been adversely impacted by the Arab Spring and the 
ensuing wave of protests and turmoil – or the absence thereof. 
As a result of this adversity, macroeconomic developments, each Arab state´s troughs and peaks 
are expected to have occurred at different times and at varying depths. From our datasets we 
have conducted identical analyses for all Arab States across the relevant period – 1996-2019. 
The following table indicates peaks and troughs, including specifications for years of 
occurrence, in the years following the Arab Spring. 
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Table 7.1 - Cycle peaks and troughs following the Arab Spring. Data: World Bank. 
We would like to pay particular attention to any cycle with a magnitude larger than one standard 
deviation. For our four countries of focus we find the following: 
Table 7.2 Cycles beyond one SD. 
In Table 7.1, the four countries investigated in this paper are highlighted in blue, GCC-countries 
in red, and the remaining in beige. Notably, a “peak” in unemployment or youth unemployment 
is considered good in the table. That is, a low point in unemployment rate indicates a positive 
sign. Across the board, there are visible peaks and troughs along the macroeconomic indicators 
evaluated. Interestingly, unemployment and youth unemployment have in many countries 
reached high levels at early stages of the Arab Spring around 2011-2014. This holds true for 
Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Morocco, and is interesting because unemployment 
has been among the most cited grievances to cause the popular revolts. 
The flipside of the coin is that, although many countries saw political adjustments or regime 
changes, economic conditions seem to have not improved. For the sake of our four countries of 
Real GDP Manufacturing Unemployment Youth unemployment M3 Credit Inflation GGD
Peak 1,94 % (2016) 5,13 % (2016) -7,44 % (2011) -9,30 % (2011) 9,19 % (2014) 17,26 % (2018) 91,61 % (2012) 13,88 % (2018)
Trough -1,04 % (2011) -6,82 % (2013) 11,83 % (2017) 13,66 % (2015) -3,63 % (2016) -165,89 % (2011) -38,27 % (2014) -51,29 % (2015)
Peak 1,16 % (2017) 2,42 % (2016) -21,52 % (2018) -17,90 % (2019) 2,86 % (2011) 7,48 % (2013) 40,45 % (2013) 9,26 % (2016)
Trough -1,22 % (2012) -0,89 % (2011) 27,14 % (2013) 20,00 % (2011) -2,72 % (2015) -2,66 % (2014) -117,05 % (2011) -20,77 % (2014)
Peak 1,53 % (2011) 0,72 % (2011) -17,66 % (2018) -2,07 % (2011) 8,23 % (2018) 11,60 % (2016) 76,45 % (2017) 14,46 % (2017)
Trough -2,46 % (2014) -2,01 % (2013) 13,01 % (2013) 12,06 % (2012) -17,13 % (2014) -18,74 % (2012) -38,46 % (2012) -8,57 % (2012)
Peak 8,50 % (2016) 29,54 % (2012) -14,52 % (2012) -12,85 % (2012) 14,41 % (2013) 88,75 % (2016) 237,46 % (2016) 55,49 % (2016)
Trough -3,16 (2011) -26,37 % (2015) 11,67 % (2017) 10,30 % (2017) -5,23 % (2017) -440,46 % (2012) -116,34 % (2017) -34,16 % (2012)
Peak 1,38 % (2011) 1,45 % (2011) -10,75 % (2014) -9,02 % (2014) 7,58 % (2011) 8,59 % (2012) 149,22 % (2018) 9,84 % (2013)
Trough -0,92 % (2018) -1,36 % (2018) 10,11 % (2016) 8,63 % (2016) -4,42 % (2018) -2,87 % (2017) -133,05 % (2016) -6,25 % (2011)
Peak 3,10 % (2012) 15,40 % (2012) -21,27 % (2017) -8,33 % (2017) 4,77 % (2013) 1,76 % (2017) 23,98 % (2016) 83,69 % (2017)
Trough -2,78 % (2017) -12,82 % (2015) 28,36 % (2013) 10,39 % (2015) -1,68 % (2016) -6,80 % (2012) -67,34 % (2018) -46,45 % (2014)
Peak 3,59 % (2014) 9,75 % (2013) -5,89 % (2011) -3,99 (2011) 2,99 % (2011) 3,13 % (2016) 112,92 % (2012) 1,28 % (2018)
Trough -8,80 % (2019) -5,33 % (2017) 0,55 % (2016) -0,33 % (2016) -0,60 % (2015) -0,44 % (2011) -243,13 % (2015) -9,20 % (2012)
Peak 15,30 % (2012) ID -1,09 % (2018) -1,44 % (2018) 8,97 % (2017) 262,71 % (2017) ID ID
Trough -50,18 % (2011) ID 1,12 % (2013) 1,29 % (2013) -9,73 % (2014) -1028,82 % (2016) ID ID
Peak 1,17 % (2015) 4,22 % (2011) -3,56 % (2011) -1,66 % (2011) 2,46 % (2011) 6,74 % (2011) 90,75 % (2018) 7,40 % (2013)
Trough -1,02 % (2016) -1,48 % (2016) 6,41 % (2014) 6,71 % (2016) -1,75 % (2013) -2,37 % (2016) -66,20 % (2014) -3,56 % (2011)
Peak 3,75 % (2016) 2,11 % (2011) -5,83 % (2017) -4,25 % (2018) 6,86 % (2015) 12,53 % (2015) 66,00 % (2017) 13,67 % (2017)
Trough -2,48 % (2011) -4,67 % (2014) 6,71 % (2013) 6,07 % (2015) -1,24 % (2013) -10,59 % (2013) -96,42 % (2015) -74,08 % (2014)
Peak 8,94 % (2011) 7,05 % (2011) -13,76 % (2014) -15,35 % (2016) 12,99 % (2014) 11,33 % (2012) 114,70 % (2016) 22,17 % (2011)
Trough -3,94 % (2018) -3,17 % (2017) 41,60 % (2012) 45,54 % (2012) -4,52 % (2016) -3,41 % (2014) -68,83 % (2011) -28,42 % (2014)
Peak 3,41 % (2015) 4,65 % (2015) -2,43 % (2015) -12,72 % (2016) 8,62 % (2014) 63,19 % (2016) 569,54 % (2018) 30,16 % (2017)
Trough -1,05 % (2018) -1,68 % (2013) 3,33 % (2018) 5,66 % (2014) -1,69 % (2011) -340,51 % (2012) -181,44 % (2017) -77,78 % (2014)
Peak 32,61 % (2011) ID -2,46 % (2011) -0,84 % (2018) ID ID 17,67 % (2012) ID
Trough -23,88 % (2014) ID 0,19 % (2015) 1,55 % (2013) ID ID ID ID
Peak 0,92 % (2014) 0,78 % (2013) -2,68 % (2018) -3,47 % (2014) 2,38 % (2011) 5,14 % (2018) 22,06 % (2018) 10,48 % (2018)
Trough -1,73 % (2011) -0,81 % (2016) 24,06 % (2011) 27,76 % (2011) -3,67 % (2015) -4,22 % (2012) -31,03 % (2016) -7,83 % (2013)
Peak 2,13 % (2015) 5,17 % (2017) -26,74 % (2016) -17,77 % (2016) 5,51 % (2014) 5,35 % (2015) 329,44 % (2018) 42,07 % (2011)
Trough -2,78 % (2011) -4,19 % (2012) 11,43 % (2013) 10,13 % (2017) -3,43 % (2018) -5,74 % (2018) -74,68 % (2012) -24,30 % (2014)
Peak 17,05 % (2014) ID -1,08 % (2018) -0,60 % (2018) ID 20,35 % (2013) 69,95 % (2011) 13,52 % (2017)
Trough -14,51 % (2016) ID 2,17 % (2013) 3,30 % (2014) ID ID -26,09 % (2014) -11,93 % (2014)
Country
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analysis, these dynamics have been previously elaborated on. However, dynamics comparable 
to those of the four countries can be found across the MENA-region. Libya saw a civil war 
erupt in 2011 – after which long-time dictator Muammar Ghaddafi was toppled and killed in 
2011 (McKernan, 2020). In subsequent years, the country has been faced with instability and 
conflict, and its economy has consequently taken a toll, among others by a -50,18 % trough in 
2011. Evidently, neighboring Tunisia and Egypt were affected. Similar dents to national 
economies come into expression in connection to wars in Syria and Yemen, as well as instability 
and conflict in Iraq. 
Although most Arab states evaded open armed conflict in the wake of the Arab Spring, the 
entire MENA-region has been impacted by increased political uncertainty, refugee flows, 
reduced tourism, and numerous threats to security and stability such as terrorist strikes 
(Britannica, 2020). Evidently, there are negative spillover-effects. Furthermore, the region´s 
conflicts have become arenas for proxy-warfare, thus exacerbating already existing friction 
among Arab- and non-Arab states. 
8.0 Integrated Institutional Development Matrix (IIDI) 
Upon evaluating the Arab Spring and the circumstances of the region, research has pointed to 
looming economic grievances such as soaring unemployment, sluggish economic growth, and 
poor inclusiveness of growth (Ianchovichina, 2018). However, commonly cited grievances 
among Arab populations, both prior to and in the wake of the Arab Spring, encompass other 
factors. Common grievances are severe inequality, corruption, and lack of trust in national 
authorities (Khan, 2014). Evidently, any elaboration on the causes and consequences of the 
Arab Spring would not be wise to circumvent social and institutional conditions. These may be 
directly connected to the protests and closely connected to the performance of economic 
indicators. 
8.1 IIDI-illustrations 
Upon constructing the Integrated Institutional Development Matrix, we have extracted data 
from twelve indices along six categories – two indices per category. These are elaborated on 
under 4.2 Integrated Institutional Development Index. All indices have been recalculated to a 
0-1 scale, whereby 1 indicates a perfect score. The below table contains scores along all indices, 
each country´s rank among Arab MENA-countries, as well as a the composite IIDI-score: 
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Table 8.1 – Integrated institutional development index, Arab Mena.   
As illustrated above, ranks 1-5 are all occupied by GCC-countries, with Qatar ranking above 
all other Arab states in 2010. On 6th and 7th place are Tunisia and Jordan respectively, with 
Lebanon and Egypt following suit on 10th and 12th. Although all indices express central 
conditions of the respective countries, “Fragility and Instability” constitute the perhaps most 
crucial category for national stability. As comes into expression, the PSI-scores of Iraq and 
Yemen were dauntingly low in 2010 – an observation that fits well with ethnic and political 
frictions, as well as subsequent incidents in these countries. Notably, Iraq and Yemen rank 16th 
and 15th respectively on the IIDI. In a plot diagram the MENA-countries displayed the 
following performance across the 12 indices constituting the composite integrated institutional 
development matrix: 












Algeria Bahrain Egypt Iraq Jordan Kuwait
Lebanon Libya Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia
Syria Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen
Fragility and instability Environment Freedom and rights Socio-economics Gender Governance
PSI FSI EHI EPI IEF IHF HDI DBI GGI GII CPI DMI
 
 92 
Notably, both Yemen and Iraq perform among the worst countries along most of the indices – 
at times competing with Syria and Libya. The GCC-countries in general perform better than the 
MENA-average. However, there are exceptions. Saudi Arabia performs worst on the DMI-
index, and the United Arab Emirates performs worst on the EPI-index. The categories in which 
MENA-countries on average perform worst are “Fragility and instability” and “Governance” 
respectively. The latter category touches on some of the primary grievances among protesters 
during the Arab Spring – corruption and oppression. 
Closely evaluating the development of institutional elements is a task that stretches beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, we would like to highlight a selection of observations. Although 
the Arab Spring brought with it hopes of political and democratic improvements, not all 
countries have experienced such progress. In 2020, countries such as Iraq, Yemen, and Syria 
all scored lower on the PSI-index than they did in 2010. Aggregate IIDI-scores were also likely 
lower. Considering the past decade´s events this should come as no surprise. Evidently, the 
threat of instability still taints countries in the region. Furthermore, countries such as Syria, 
Libya, Lebanon, and Yemen have all seen contractions to their HDI-scores from 2010 to 2019. 
Other countries have seen meagre and sluggish improvements to their HDI-scores across the 
same period. Seemingly then, many Arab states have fallen short in improving social and 
economic factors that constitute the HDI-scale. It also bears witness that the Arab Spring may 
have fallen short in achieving its original aspirations. 
8.2 IIDI-GDP-regressions 
Upon assessing a possible connection between IIDI-scores and economic performance in the 
wake of the Arab Spring, as expressed by GDP-troughs, we have conducted a set of simple 
linear regressions along an IIDI-GDP-cycle-dimension. Naturally, the analysis will be affected 
by adversity in economic strength prior to the revolts, as well as the depth of the GDP-troughs. 
The simple linear regression looks as follows: 
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Figure 8.2 - IIDI-GDP-regressions, Arab MENA.  
As illustrated above, the trend line displays a very modest degree of explanatory power – a mere 
5,79 %. This is not satisfactory. However, it should be mentioned that the outliers of the data 
set, constituted by Libya, Syria, and Yemen, were heavily affected by civil wars. The fourth 
outlier is Iraq – a country also diminished by high levels of conflict during the past decade. The 
-50,18 % GDP-trough in Libya occurred during the same year as former dictator Muammar 
Ghaddafi was toppled, and Libyan economic activity, particularly its oil production, was ground 
to a brutal halt. Similarly, the eruption of armed conflict has tainted both Syria and Yemen since 
2011 and 2014 respectively. As such, armed conflict skews the regression. 
Furthermore, the asymmetric economic strength across the region impacts the evaluation of 
IIDI-scores´ role in explaining economic contractions. Being wealthy oil-rich nations, the GCC-
countries were to a lower degree, and in some cases not at all, directly harmed by the Arab 
Spring. The only apparent exception was Bahrain which saw large-scale protests. However, 
these were cracked down with assistance from neighboring Saudi Arabia (McEvers, 2012). 
Seemingly, political instability and armed conflict work in tandem with differences in valuable 
natural resource access to skew the regression. The weak explanatory power comes as no 
surprise due to its simplified nature. We may evaluate countries not tainted by open conflict 
and not inhibiting large valuable natural resources. Upon doing so, we conduct a similar simple 
linear regression by excluding Libya, Syria, Yemen, and the GCC-countries. This yields the 
following regression: 
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Figure 8.3 - IIDI-GDP-regressions, Arab MENA without war-ravaged countries and GCC. 
Although the sample is small, encompassing in total 7 countries, the regression displays a far 
clearer relationship between IIDI-scores and GDP-cycles when excluding war-ravaged 
countries and the GCC-countries. This regression boasts an explanatory power of 60,96 % - far 
more satisfactory than 5,79 %. To draw clearer conclusions, however, a multiple regression 
analysis with a larger sample of countries could be conducted. Nevertheless, this is an indication 
that there might be a relationship between institutional quality and economic performance 
among the relevant countries – although some institutional parameters may be more pivotal 
than others. 
9.0 The seven-step dynamic crisis model and evidence from the 
Arab Spring 
In this section we will elaborate on empirical evidence from our macroeconomic datasets in 
light of the seven-step dynamic crisis model. Upon doing so, we will draw from foregoing 
analyses to assess whether Arab states displayed symptoms like those indicated in the model. 
We will also present tables and graphs to supplement the analysis. Building on these findings, 
we will later conclude on the role of economics in the eruption of the Arab Spring, as well as 
its consequences. 
Notably, we expect caveats to the application of the chosen model in tandem with the context 
of the Arab Spring. In cases where we have lack of clear evidence symptomatic of a specific 
stage, we will elaborate on this.  That is, our empirical evidence will not necessarily fit with all 
stages of the model as it is stipulated in literature, and thus likely not constitute an academic 
Cinderella-story. Nevertheless, we expect it to constitute a solid framework for macroeconomic 
analysis highlighting central elements to the build-up and spread of crisis. 
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The Arab Spring entailed adverse consequences across the Middle East. But regardless of the 
degree of instability, all Arab nations felt the shockwaves of the protests to some extent. As 
specified in literature under Disruption, exogenous factors may affect the direction of markets 
and to some degree affect economic activity and stability (Grytten & Hunnes, 2016). 
Accordingly, the eruption of widespread protests, and in some cases armed conflict, is 
considered the exogenous shock that disrupted Arab economies in late 2010, early 2011, and 
the years that followed. The following sections seek to assess the Arab Spring based on the 
seven-step dynamic crisis model. 
9.1 Disruption 
Kindleberger indicates that the journey towards a crisis is typically initiated by an exogenous 
macroeconomic shock that changes the direction of the economy (Grytten & Hunnes, 2016). 
Evidently, elements outside of the economic landscape may affect the tide, and a specific 
example is war. In our analysis, we perceive the eruption of widespread protests across the 
Middle East to constitute an exogenous shock that induced considerable damage to the 
economic status and outlook of many countries in the region. Thus, we deem the Arab Spring 
a shock that altered economies in a negative direction with presumably decreased economic 
activity. This contrasts with the perception of exogenous shocks that induce increased activity 
– such as expansive modifications to fiscal and monetary policies that would accelerate the 
economy by stimulating the demand side. However, as discussed earlier in the paper, such 
expansive policies have taken place in the Middle East during the past decade, although not 
achieving the intended results. 
Although the Arab Spring is considered to have had a negative impact on economic activity, 
not a positive one as stipulated in the literature by Grytten & Hunnes  (2016), it is reasonable 
to assess the dynamics of our macroeconomic indicators. Elements described in the seven-step 
dynamic crisis model may well be visible during the age of the Arab Spring. According to our 
data, many Arab countries have displayed poorer performance in the wake of the protests and 
wars that ensued and have simultaneously shown signs of credit and money growth. The latter 
sign of expansive fiscal policies is in accordance with descriptions of the disruption stage in the 
literature. It is also a common observation among countries undergoing crises for authorities to 
strive towards counterbalancing negative shocks. 
It should also be noted that many considered the Arab Spring a promising set of events for the 
region, with promises and hopes of democratic reform, economic improvements, and increased 
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stability. As such, one may have perceived the wave of demands gushing through Arab 
countries as an indication of better times to come, albeit faced with uncertainty of the actual 
outcomes. Any such progress would contrast with the strict dictatorial regimes of the past 
diminished by limited private enterprise freedom and inefficient rigid government control. As 
such, any successful democratic transition could entail fruitful economic potential. In hindsight, 
the events of 2010, 2011, and the years that followed, have not brought with them significant 
improvements to protestors´ grievances. Rather, conditions have, according to our data, 
stagnated and in some cases even deteriorated. In that sense, the Arab Spring did not constitute 
a positive induction to Arab economies, nor did governments successfully cater to social 
grievances. 
9.2 Overheating 
An economic overheating is diminished by a level of activity above sustainable levels. This is 
interpreted as any level of activity above trend indication that could induce unfortunate effects 
on the economy. As a precondition to this type of development, the foregoing disruption should 
improve expectations in the relevant economies. At the starting point of the Arab Spring in 
2010, quite a few Arab countries displayed positive cycle values for a range of macroeconomic 
indicators – as illustrated in Table 6.1. However, these occurred prior to the eruption of 
widespread protests and turmoil that constitute the exogenous shock in this paper. As such, we 
deem it unlikely that economic performance above trend in 2010 lead to the following uprisings. 
This is further discussed below. 
The implied chronology of the model indicates that disruption occurs and then induces 
overheating. Judging by the seeming cycle booms in 2010, there may have been signals of an 
overheating occurring prior to the events that unfolded during the past decade. In that sense, it 
does not seem intuitive to blame positive cycles for the eruption of the Arab Spring. In contrast 
to this can be mentioned that protests and unrest occurred among other reasons due to poor 
economic conditions. This is indicative that, although cycle values were positive in 2010, 
economic parameters were far from good. This has been underlined earlier in the paper and 
underscores the importance of a kaleidoscopic approach – merely evaluating cycles is not 
adequate in this case. Evidently, a boom does not mean things are going great in the relevant 
economies. Rather, it implies that things are slightly better than estimated. Furthermore, our 
analysis indicates that the immediate years following the Arab Spring entailed drawbacks to 
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economic activity for many countries in the region. As such, it may be the case that economic 
overheating is a less relevant element when discussing the causes of the Arab Spring. 
However, reminiscent of overheating along a GDP-dimension, our four countries of focus saw 
their GDP-cycles peak during the first half of the past decade. GDP-cycles peaked in Jordan 
and Egypt in 2011. Lebanon and Tunisia experienced the same in 2014. Albeit indicating 
positive cycles, thus also booms, the overall development in the aftermath of the Arab Spring 
indicates a cooldown in the real economy – as expressed in Table 9.4 and Figure 9.3. 
Essentially, any trend estimate for the period after the Arab Spring will be impacted by 
economic performance during that time. This means that a peak in 2011 may have occurred due 
to weak dynamics after 2011, not necessarily 2011 being a golden year. Again, this underscores 
the importance of correct interpretation. In conclusion, there is little evidence to show that 
overheating on an aggregate level has occurred due to the exogenous shock. 
An overheating might be more fitting when assessing the effect of counter-cyclical fiscal 
policies conducted by Arab governments to counterbalance the negative impacts of the uprising. 
Although GDP-cycles indicate otherwise, risks of overheating in developing economies such 
as Egypt remained relevant as reforms and large inflows of foreign capital set the stage for an 
economic spur in the past decade (Birch, 2019). Despite being primarily supply-side driven and 
staying below former growth rates. Similar challenges are relevant for Tunisia. This may 
constitute a warning sign in tandem with high inflationary pressure – thus also a warning sign 
for overheating. Furthermore, inflationary pressures, primarily driven by increases in energy- 
and food prices, hamper the establishment of coherent fiscal policies (IMF, 2013). In the wake 
of the Arab Spring then, there may have been signs of a looming financial overheating. 
Interestingly, increases in credit volumes and money stock persisted throughout the first phases 
of the Arab Spring although at a slower pace in some countries. In Egypt, however, broad 
money stock and net domestic credit grew at a relatively high pace after 2010 according to our 
data. Perhaps this can be perceived as signs of counter-cyclical fiscal policies to cancel out the 
immediate negative effects of the Arab Spring. However, as our analysis has shown, it does not 
seem as though such measures have entailed fruitful impacts on economic development during 
the past decade. To make matters worse, many Arab countries have been pushed towards 
increased generalized subsidies and public wages to maintain political stability (IMF, 2013). 
As such, they are trapped between popular demands and IMF guidelines. This has further 
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aggravated the burden of budget deficits and government debt levels. Annual growth of broad 
money and credit volumes appear as follows: 
 
Figure 9.1 - Annual growth of broad money and credit volumes for Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia, 1997-2019.  
In 2011, both parameters displayed growth across the four countries indicating money and 
credit expansion. The only country to experience reductions to its broad money stock is Jordan. 
Other than that, volumes kept increasing despite drawbacks to the real economy. Particularly 
noticeable is the 2016 spike in Egypt. As such, there seems to have been an increase in the 
demand for credit simultaneously with decent growth rates and 13,81 % consumer price 
inflation. These are credible symptoms of overheating. This has been covered under section 7.2 
Egypt. 
Although there are indications of overheating occurring, the only country to have displayed 
cycles beyond one standard deviation is Egypt in 2011, when real GDP saw a 1.53 % cycle 
peak. Table 7.2 illustrates this. Evidently, across our four countries there is little evidence for 
the occurrence of an overall overheating. 
9.3 Bubble economy 
Following the abovementioned lack of clear evidence for overheating, there is little empirical 
evidence in our data to indicate the development of a bubble. In the literature, a bubble economy 
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slowdown, and expansion in money and credit. Interestingly, the two latter dynamics can be 
seen across a range of Arab nations for the relevant period although not necessarily caused by 
speculation and irrational optimism in investment markets. Debt-financed speculation, 
however, does not seem apparent in our data. Nevertheless, the following section will elaborate 
on stock market dynamics in connection to the Arab Spring as markets reacted to the exogenous 
shock. 
9.4 Nervousness and turning point 
In the fourth phase, literature describes that there is fear of a downward correction. As the name 
of the phase says, the market behaves nervously, and reacts strongly to new information. The 
Arab Spring has caused increased uncertainty and disclosed severe regional structural 
challenges. Among others there has been a weak business climate, lack of job opportunities and 
low competitiveness. The growth has been faltering, due to political and economic instability. 
It has also been more difficult to get access to finance and the fiscal deficits are widening given 
the rising commodity prices, reduced economic growth, and increasing public spending 
(Thiemann, 2011). Market indices for our four respective countries appear as follows: 
Figure 9.2 – Market index for Jordan (ASE), Egypt (EGX30), Lebanon (BSI) and Tunisia (TUNINDEX). Source: Tradingeconomics 2021 and 
Liveindex 2021.  
The graphs illustrate clear turning points in relation to the financial crisis. Moreover, it is also 
clearly visible that the Arab Spring has had an impact on stock markets. Notably, neither the 
Jordanian nor the Lebanese indices have recovered since then. In contrast, Egyptian and 
Tunisian indices have. The liquidity of these markets can be measured by the value of 
transaction volumes. Low volumes little buying and selling activity, and the opposite holds true 
for high volumes. In table 9.1, one can see that Egypt is by far the largest and most active 
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market. Transaction volumes peaked for Egypt and Jordan in 2008. Moreover, as can be seen 
in 2010, trade volumes were more subdued. In the following year, when the Arab spring arose, 
these fell dramatically. 
Table 9.1 – Relative value of market transactions of Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan exchanges, $ million. Source: World 
Federation of Exchanges, Paris, 2012; Bourse de Tunis, Annual Report, 2011. 
In the model´s fifth phase, negative expectations take over and the market turns to the so-called 
"Minsky Moment". Optimism turns into pessimism and asset prices fall. The uprisings in 2011 
gave citizens hope that it was the beginning of a turning point for a democratic transition in the 
Arab world. Unfortunately, over the past decade, the economic issues have taken a back seat. 
A combination of domestic and external shocks seems to have contributed to economies that 
are in worse shape than they were prior to the uprisings. Although most Arab states evaded 
open armed conflict in the wake of the Arab Spring, the entire MENA-region has been impacted 
by social unrest and political turmoil that caused the security situation to deteriorate. This has 
in turn created increased uncertainty for investors. 
As a supplement to this phase, we want to briefly comment the stock market proposals before 
and during the Arab Spring. Here, we find some interesting observations in stock market 
dynamics across our four specified countries. These appear as follows: 
 
Table 9.2 – Market index dynamics pre- and post-Arab spring.  
Expectedly, crashes appear larger in financial markets due to the financial crisis. However, 
declines following the Arab Spring are also significant. In Tunisia, the impact of the Arab 
Spring even seems to have outweighed that of the financial crisis (Mnif , 2015). These numbers 
mirror the dynamics illustrated in Figure 9.2. The increased uncertainty resulted in investor 
panic (African Development Bank, 2012) . Neither the Amman Stock Exchange nor the Beirut 
Stock Exchange have at any point recovered to pre-Arab Spring levels. All these observations 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Egypt 6,51 26,24 48,08 60,20 93,48 73,47 38,21 16,13
Tunisia 529,00 1,27 3,43 1,35 3,32 2,67 2,90 1,16
Jordan 5,35 23,82 20,05 17,43 28,96 28,96 8,60 3,90
Lebanon N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Market Index Country Start of a decline Bottom level after decline Amplitude (%)
May 2008 May 2009 -71 %
EGX30
April 2010 December 2011 -52 %
June 2008 February 2009 -45 %
ASE
January 2011 January 2012 -18 %
July 2008  Mars 2009 -51 %
BSI
January 2011 January 2012 -28 %
 September 2008 December 2008 -17 %
TUNINDEX







are consistent and a consequence of political uncertainty that induces financial instability (Mnif, 
2015). 
9.5 Crisis 
The sixth phase of the model describes increasing mistrust in relevant markets, and growing 
pessimism towards investments. Credit institutions shy away due to the risk of bankruptcies 
and financial losses, and as such enterprises are financially throttled. Consequently, the real 
economy may take a toll with symptoms of crisis appearing in unemployment rates, 
manufacturing volumes, and real GDP. Such effects are described earlier in the paper, and the 
combination of financial and real economic contractions constitute an overall economic crisis 
such as the one currently engulfing Lebanon. The lingering international investment behavior 
comes into expression when evaluating FDI-volumes for our four specified countries: 
Figure 9.3 – Foreign direct investment flows for Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia, 1996-2019.  
Being the largest of the four economies, dynamics in Egypt become dramatically visible in the 
above graph. Prior to the financial crisis of 2007/2008, FDI had displayed record volumes 
peaking at 11,578 billion USD in 2007. Compared to bottom levels at mere 237, 4 million USD 
in 2003, this constitutes an overall increase of 4777,4 %. In Egypt, the impact of the financial 
crisis is clear. In the three other countries not so much. Lebanon saw a slight increase in FDI-
volumes initially. So did Tunisia. FDI-flows to Jordan, on the other hand, shrunk. Evidently, 
what may resemble positive expectations to Arab economies prior to 2007 and 2011 turned to 
negative expectations after the eruption of region wide unrest. 
Although the events of 2007/2008 entailed adverse effects on these four Arab economies, the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring revolts is less ambiguous. Percentage changes to FDI-flows for 
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Table 9.3 - Percentage changes to FDI-flows 2011 and for 2010-2019.  
Clearly then, foreign capital to some extent shied away during the first year of unrest as is an 
expected consequence of increased uncertainty and instability. Interestingly, FDI-flows have 
not recovered during the past decade, the only exception being Egypt. The other three, on the 
other hand, have seen their FDI-flows significantly reduced compared to 2010-levels. 
Not seldomly, authorities will intervene to soften the downturn and restart the economic engine. 
Being low- and middle-income countries, our four states of focus have had limited resources to 
independently create buffers against an economic slowdown (Martin & Sunley, 2020). 
Typically then, any attempt at countering negative shocks may entail external funding. In the 
case of the Arab MENA-region, countries have seen adverse support packages, some in the 
form of international IMF-grants, aid packages, and bilateral regional support agreements 
(Diwan, 2016). Evidently, one sign of authorities attempting to handle the negative effects of 
the Arab Spring should appear in general government debt levels. These appear as follows: 
 
Table 9.4 – General government debt levels developments.  
Inhabiting high debt-GDP ratios is not necessarily problematic, but the pressure of debt and the 
risk of default depends on a range of factors. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis underscores 
three of these: growth rates, interest rates on debt, and the strength and independence of 
institutions, central banks, and monetary policy (Hennerich, 2020). These three factors are 
essential in Arab states´ response to the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Under 5.4 Integrated 
Institutional Development Matrix (IIDI) we elaborated on institutional strength, and under 6.2 
Overheating, we elaborated on the economic growth slowdown in the past decade – a bad omen 
for Arab economies. 
Evidently, the four countries of emphasis have performed less-than-impressive along 
institutional parameters, impact of monetary policies, and accuracy of central banks. As such, 
acquiring high levels of debt relative to GDP should be an economic shear to circumvent. This 
has, however, not been the case, and Table 9.4 illustrates evidence of higher debt levels. These 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Jordan Lebanon Tunisia
Changes to FDI-flows, 2010-2019
Changes to FDI-flows, 2011 -107,56 % -67,58 %
41,10 % -51,11 % -48,05 % -39,29 %
-11,98 % -26,70 %
General government debt 1996-2010 average 2010 2011 2011-2019 average Peak 2011-2019 2019
Egypt 80,22 % 69,60 % 72,80 % 86,74 % 103,20 % (2017) 83,80 %
Tunisia 54,47 % 39,20 % 43,10 % 58,66 % 78,20 % (2018) 72,30 %
Jordan 85,43 % 59,40 % 62,10 % 74,23 % 78,00 % (2019) 78,00 %
Lebanon 162,70 % 136,80 % 134,40 % 145,01 % 174,50 % (2019) 174,50 %
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levels have persisted up until today and are likely not improving under the current 
circumstances (World Bank, 2021). 
9.6 Spread 
The model stipulates that any crisis, if it lasts long enough, may spread to the real economy. 
Although the Arab Spring cannot be unambiguously considered a pure financial crisis, it 
undoubtedly struck the real economy of many Arab economies with fierce force. One indicator 
is real GDP. Sadly, it appears as if the economic hardship that inspired Arab populations to 
protest in 2010 and 2011 have persisted up until today. To make matters worse, the region has 
been harmed by the current pandemic situation, with growth prospects even more daunting than 
before (United Nations, 2020). Evidently, the economic challenges that followed the unrest 
appear to have spread further and attached its roots across the region. In the rural Tunisian town 
Sidi Bouzid, the cradle of the Arab Spring, the hardships that drove protestors to the streets 
eleven years ago remain relevant (Al-Shamahi, 2020). 
Mentioning the pace of annual growth rates is a natural extension to the discussion of GDP-
cycles as expressed by trend estimates. All four countries under investigation displayed high 
growth rates leading up to the financial crisis with slight dips in growth rates ensuing 2008. 
Growth rates fell further after 2010. Interestingly, Lebanese GDP grew at an accelerating pace 
peaking in 2009 at 10.23 % according to our data sets. Although growth rates in the prelude to 
the Arab Spring for the most part decelerated, they were nonetheless relatively strong. The 
aftermath of the Arab Spring, however, is less ambiguous. All four countries, except for Jordan, 
saw their growth rates visibly reduced. Jordan, on the other hand, has seen growth rates swaying 
between 2 % and 3.4 %, a clear slowdown compared to the foregoing decade. Visible 
slowdowns are relevant across all four countries: 












1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Annual GDP growth rates
EGYPT LEBANON JORDAN TUNISIA
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The following table elaborates these dynamics: 
Table 9.5 – GDP-growth rates for our four specific countries 1996-2019. 
Across these four countries then, there is little evidence that the exogenous shock induced levels 
of economic activity above a sustainable long-term trajectory. Rather, growth rates decelerated 
visibly as the consequences of the Arab Spring spread. Particularly worrisome is the economic 
development of Lebanon which in later years has experienced a prolonged economic crisis only 
exacerbated by regional conflict and the covid-pandemic. In 2018 and 2019 the Lebanese 
economy receded by -1.93 % and -6.70 % respectively. Arab economies, at least the four 
specified here, appear to have cooled down along GDP-dimensions, and had their growth 
trajectories visibly reduced. Thus, the crisis seems to have spread to the real economies of these 
countries. 
As our data has shown, the aftermath of the Arab Spring brought upon the four specified 
countries reduced growth rates and visibly increased levels of both total- and youth 
unemployment. Interestingly, even though unemployment rates are typically lagging 
procyclical macroeconomic indicators, the negative impact of the unrest came into expression 
already in the first year of the Arab Spring. Unemployment further increased in the years that 
followed. The following table provides an indication of these effects on the labor market: 
Table 9.6 – Development of the unemployment rate, 1996-2019.  
As both Egypt and Tunisia saw large scale protests and regime changes occurring shortly after 
the first demonstrators gathered, the effect on unemployment became visible already in 2011. 
As for Jordan and Lebanon, which did not experience similar political alterations, 2011 did not 
carry with it immediate signs of trouble. For Jordan however, both overall- and youth 
unemployment increased at some point during the aftermath of the Arab Spring as elaborated 
earlier in the paper. 
GDP growth rate 1996-2010 average 2010 2011 2011-2019 average 2019
Egypt 5,15 % 5,15 % 1,76 % 3,65 % 5,56 %
Tunisia 4,52 % 3,51 % -1,92 % 1,77 % 1,04 %
Jordan 5,48 % 2,31 % 2,74 % 2,40 % 1,96 %
Lebanon 4,54 % 7,98 % 0,87 % 0,41 % -6,70 %
1996-2010 average 2010 2011 2011-2019 average 2019 1996-2010 average 2010 2011 2011-2019 average 2019
Egypt 9,32 % 8,76 % 11,85 % 12,04 % 10,76 % 26,03 % 24,53 % 29,47 % 32,53 % 31,05 %
Tunisia 14,12 % 13,05 % 18,33 % 16,07 % 16,02 % 30,21 % 29,49 % 42,63 % 36,14 % 36,26 %
Jordan 13,84 % 12,50 % 12,90 % 13,74 % 14,72 % 29,89 % 28,93 % 30,12 % 32,45 % 35,03 %





The exception is Lebanon that has not experienced significant changes to unemployment rates 
during 2011-2019. However, that is not to say that the Lebanese economy is not grappling its 
demons. Skyrocketing government debt levels, real economy standstill, illiquidity of banks and 
public corruption are only a few examples of factors thwarting Lebanese opportunities for 
progress (Bisat, Cassard & Diwan, 2021). During the past decade, the country has experienced 
deterioration along both financial and real economic dimensions and finds itself in an overall 
economic crisis. Adding to this, incompetent political leadership, and occasionally lack of 
leadership at all, further contributes to inefficiency and instability. Painfully aware of its recent 
past, the Lebanese population appears to be inching towards the threat of renewed conflict. 
Not seldomly, any crisis will spread across borders and potentially become a challenge for 
countries and organizations outside of the specific geographic area. In such cases, the need for 
cooperation and coordinated measures between authorities and supranational organizations may 
arise. The IMF is actively involved in assisting countries in the region, and tailors the economic 
toolkit to each individual country (Masood, 2012). In addition, retaining and protecting the 
stability of Arab nations is in the in interest of other countries in the region, in addition to 
nations elsewhere. Thus, the Arab Spring is a factor to be accounted for by others than those 
directly affected. 
The issue remains, however, that the MENA-countries must muster political will to follow 
through with suggested reforms and strict requirements by organizations such as the IMF 
(Mitra, 2015). Pointing to the deterioration of economic conditions across Arab countries, 
Masood Ahmed, IMF-director for the Middle East and Central Asia, underlines the risk of 
economic stagnation in case of delays or failures in implementation (Masood, 2014). He also 
emphasizes the threat of increasing popular discontent to political and economic transitions. 
Evidently, Arab states must follow through with economically necessary albeit widely 
unpopular reforms. 
10. Conclusions  
In our thesis we have elaborated whether economic conditions were to blame for the eruption 
of widespread protests across the MENA-region in 2010, 2011, and subsequent years. Primarily 
the discussion has revolved around a section of selected macroeconomic indicators to assess 
dynamics and cycles along real economic- and financial dimensions. These are discussed in the 
framework of the seven-step dynamic crisis model. In addition, we have conducted an analysis 
of institutional strength in the respective countries expressed by the composite integrated 
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institutional development index (IIDI). This was done to highlight the role of societal factors 
when discussing the Arab Spring revolts. Evidently, both economic and institutional factors 
have played a part in the eruption of protests, as was expressed by Arab populations ten years 
ago. 
Upon approaching the Arab Spring from a macroeconomic perspective, we have discerned the 
paper into two parts. Firstly, we have sought to find out whether the economic landscape was 
particularly rugged in the time leading up to 2011, and if cycles in 2010 gave any 
macroeconomic indication of what was to come. These cycles were calculated using an HP-
filter with a smoothing parameter of 100 corresponding to annual data. Cycle values at the 
doorstep of the protests provide an indication of the economic health of Arab nations in 2010. 
Secondly, we have analyzed developments along the same indicators for the time that ensued. 
This was done by applying the same toolkit as for the pre-Arab Spring period. Macroeconomic 
peaks and troughs during 2011-2019 are illustrated in Table 7.1. This data illustrates the 
different dynamics occurring across the region in the wake of the Arab Spring. As such, this 
section of the analysis constitutes an indication of the consequences of the exogenous shock, 
and whether protestor´s grievances have been catered to in the ensuing years. As such, it also 
indicates if the Arab Spring has borne fruits regarding Arab populations´ economic grievances. 
That is, if macroeconomic parameters are better off than they were in 2010. 
Furthermore, the paper contains an assessment of Arab nations across a set of institutional 
parameters. Upon doing so, we have mapped each country´s performance along 12 individual 
indices within 6 categories and calculated a composite index score for each country. Not 
surprisingly, we find that a range of countries in the MENA-region perform poorly on this 
index, as well as on the individual subindices. This is indicative of societal conditions that may 
have come into play in the eruption of protests and the ensuing negative effects of such 
instability. As a part of our analysis, we have also conducted a simple linear regression of IIDI 
scores relative to GDP cycles in the post-Arab Spring period. 
Our findings suggest that there is evidence of a correlation between institutional strength in 
Arab MENA-countries and GDP-cycles after the Arab Spring when excluding war-ravaged 
countries and GCC-countries. This exclusion was conducted to isolate the effects of war, and 
to account for the wealth asymmetries in the region. This correlation was expected. When asked 
about their motivations for attending protests in 2011, many Arabs voiced concern over 
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economic factors such as high unemployment rates and price hikes. However, protestors were 
also motivated by increasing inequality, corruption, and oppression. As such, our IIDI-findings 
are a manifestation of these concerns. 
Furthermore, we discern our findings on the development and status of the selected 
macroeconomic indicators within the framework of the seven-step dynamic crisis model. When 
doing so, our analysis has sought to uncover whether our findings are compatible to the 
description of the stages in the model. In addition to establishing if economic circumstances 
were at fault for the eruption of protest, we sought to assess whether conditions have improved 
since 2010. 
We do not perceive the Arab Spring as an exogenous macroeconomic shock that increases the 
level of economic activity, as is a feature of disruption in literature. Rather, our perception is 
that the eruption of protests in the Arab World constituted a shock that had adverse negative 
impacts on Arab economies. Nevertheless, literature also exemplifies war as being one factor 
that can induce such an exogenous shock. This makes the eruption of protests and uprisings 
across the Middle East relevant. Our data supports the image of the Arab Spring being an 
exogenous shock with a disruptive effect, albeit in a negative direction. In that sense, we cannot 
establish clearly that an overheating has taken place, as this is preconditioned on a positive 
economic shift and expectations of continued growth stemming from the exogenous shock. We 
do, however, find symptoms of overheating occurring in the wake of the Arab Spring – for 
example in Egypt. Here we find cycles in broad money in 2018 and net domestic credit in 2016 
of 8.23 % and 11.60 % respectively. These cycles go beyond one standard deviation for the 
sample. Our analysis has also uncovered inflationary cycles beyond one standard deviation for 
all countries but Lebanon in 2017 and 2018, reminiscent of an overheating. 
Although there is little evidence for debt- and speculation driven growth in our case, we have 
uncovered indications of money- and credit expansion in Egypt in 2016 and 2018. For the three 
other countries, however, we find little evidence for this. Evidently, bubble economy appears 
less significant. Compatible with descriptions of tightened credit supply under nervousness, our 
analysis has shown negative cycles beyond one standard deviation for broad money and net 
domestic credit in Egypt. These are conspicuous signs of reduced money and credit supply. 
Importantly, although notable cycles as per our requirements have been found only in Egypt, 
there are indications of a slowdown in annual money and credit growth in Jordan and Lebanon 
as well after the Arab Spring. 
 
 108
Stock market indices in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Tunisia all display movements 
reminiscent of crashes. Particularly noticeable is the fall on the Tunisian and Egyptian stock 
exchanges. Likely, these dynamics are largely attributable to the decreased stability and 
increased uncertainty that was dominant in the region in the first years of the Arab Spring. 
Interestingly, Tunisian, and Egyptian indices seem to have recovered beyond 2010-levels, 
whereas the Amman and Beirut stock exchanges seem to be lagging in their recovery. The 
drying out of investments and capital is further exacerbated by FDI-data indicating a visible 
reduction – particularly in Egypt. FDI-flows have only recovered to pre-Arab Spring levels in 
Egypt as of today. We interpret this as a manifestation of sustained issues related to instability 
and uncertainty. 
Market decline and increasing mistrust are also underscored by FDI-flight. Stock market 
crashes, and persistently low indices in Lebanon and Jordan, manifest increased pessimism 
towards and within Arab economies. Symptomatic of crisis, our findings suggest a significant 
dent on the labor markets of our four countries of focus. According to our analysis, Egypt, 
Jordan, and Tunisia displayed unemployment cycles beyond one standard deviation for both 
total and youth unemployment. All but Lebanon saw their total- and youth unemployment rates 
rise in the first year of the Arab Spring, and visibly increasing during 2010-2019. Furthermore, 
both Egypt and Tunisia saw noticeable negative GDP cycles in 2014 and 2011 respectively, 
and all four countries underwent decelerating growth rates. We perceive these as clear signs of 
the real economy taking a toll of the Arab Spring. 
Our analysis has shown a stagnation of economic growth and a worrisome increase in 
unemployment rates in a region already troubled by poor economic health. As such, the 
exogenous shock quickly propagated into both the financial and real economies of the 
respective countries. We deem this evidential of the crisis spreading.  Furthermore, our data has 
shown visible general government debt cycles, as well as a general increase in government 
indebtment in the decade following the Arab Spring, reaching as far as 174.50 % of GDP in 
Lebanon. This indebtment is largely due to coordinated efforts in the form of IMF- and other 
grants to alleviate the strain on Arab economies. In that manner, the economic burdens 
following the Arab Spring are also carried by the international communities. 
Boiling down our analysis, we find that macroeconomic circumstances alone were not at fault 
for the eruption of the Arab Spring. Cycles do not indicate significant troughs in 2010. 
Nevertheless, poor economic performance, non-inclusive growth, and high unemployment rates 
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have played a part. Furthermore, poor performance along institutional dimensions have been 
detrimental for the regional development in the Middle East and North Africa in the past decade. 
Our findings also indicate that macroeconomic conditions in many countries have not 
improved. Rather, conditions have in some cases worsened. Thus, the challenges that motivated 
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